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Inequity aversion, the negative response to receiving an unequal reward,
has been intensely studied and is well established in humans. However, why humans
developed a profound sense of equity is still enigmatic, and the evolutionary roots of
this interesting phenomenon are still largely unknown. The little research that has been
completed on nonhuman primates indicates that some species, like humans, are
inequity averse, while others are not. Brosnan and de Waal (2003) suggested that an
aversion to inequitable outcomes coevolved as a response to an increased emphasis
on cooperative relationships, where individuals would respond negatively when their
rewards differed from those of a social partner. Chen and Santos (2006), however,
suggested that inequity aversion evolved in response to contrast effects, or individual
expectations, in which individuals would respond negatively when their rewards differed
from those previously received by the individual; this suggests that an animal forms
expectations that are irrespective of rewards received by a social partner.
This study aimed to test these two hypotheses by examining responses to
inequitable outcomes in three yet untested primate genera (Gorilla, Nomascus, and
Papio) and one genus which has been previously tested (Pongo). To investigate
responses to inequitable outcomes, an established inequity paradigm was used
i

following Brosnan and de Waal (2003), in which primate subjects were required to
complete a task before receiving a reward. Because only responses to differences in
reward quality had been tested with nonhuman primates using this paradigm, this study
introduced an additional test condition to determine how reward quantity differences
would affect individual responses to unequal offerings. It was found that some olive
baboons, western-lowland gorillas, and white-cheeked gibbons responded negatively to
both individual expectations and social expectations. Orangutans, however, responded
to individual expectations, but not to social expectations. This study suggests that there
is individual variation in inequity responses of olive baboons, western-lowland gorillas,
and white-cheeked gibbons; this is similar to the individual variation in inequity aversion
that has been proposed for chimpanzees and bonobos. This study also suggests that
orangutans are not inequity averse, which supports results found in previous studies of
orangutan inequity aversion.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Humans and nonhuman primates must continuously make decisions in order to
navigate their social and ecological environments. In order to maximize their fitness, it is
generally assumed that individuals would make decisions to maximize the benefits and
minimize the costs of behaviors. However, individuals sometimes act in ways which
appear not to maximize their individual fitness, and these behaviors could be
interpreted as the result of irrational decision-making. For instance, it may seem
irrational for an individual to give up an available resource, especially if resources are
scarce, only because it is of unequal value compared to a social partner’s. This is a
behavioral phenomenon known as inequity aversion, and it has been observed in
humans and nonhuman primates. Due to the prevalence of inequity aversion in several
species of the primate lineage, it is important to understand when and why an individual
may make such an ‘irrational’ decision and why this behavior would evolve and persist
throughout evolutionary history.
Inequity aversion can be defined as “the aversive reaction to an unequal
distribution of resources” (Massen et al., 2012:145) and can be distinguished as either
disadvantageous or advantageous (Brosnan and de Waal, 2012). Disadvantageous
inequity occurs when an individual receives a “lesser valued outcome than a social
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partner,” indicating that individuals who exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion will
reject a reward that is of lesser value than a social partner’s reward (Brosnan and de
Waal, 2012:337). Advantageous inequity occurs when an individual receives “a more
valuable outcome than a social partner,” indicating that individuals who exhibit
advantageous inequity aversion will reject a reward that is of greater value than a social
partner’s reward (Brosnan and de Waal, 2012:337).
A response to advantageous inequity aversion is particularly interesting given the
“selfish” nature of Darwinian evolution, in which the individual is the unit of selection.
This follows from the idea that natural selection generally only promotes behaviors that
benefit the fitness of an actor. Thus, if behaviors are selected upon because they
increase the survival or reproductive success on an individual level, it is curious that an
individual would give up a resource because it was greater than what a conspecific
would receive. It is especially interesting that an individual would behave in a way that
benefits non-kin group members at a cost to themselves.
There are at least two scenarios that may explain why individuals express
advantageous inequity aversion. A negative response to advantageous inequity may be
a prosocial behavior, in which individuals help one another work toward a goal that
cannot be achieved individually (Brosnan and de Waal, 2012). It is also possible that
individuals who express advantageous inequity aversion may be sensitive to potential
future retaliation (Brosnan et al., 2010). A social partner could retaliate if the individual
accepts a better reward than what is given to their social partner. Until more is known
about how inequity aversion may have evolved, it is difficult to determine why
individuals would reject a greater reward than that of a social partner.
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The aim of this study was to contribute to the understanding of when and why an
individual may be inequity averse and how this trait may have evolved in humans.
Extant nonhuman primate species are good models for testing hypotheses about the
evolution of inequity aversion in humans for two main reasons. Nonhuman primates are
the closest living relatives of humans, indicating that testing nonhuman primates can
provide information about whether inequity aversion may have evolved from a common
ancestor of humans and other nonhuman primate lineages. Additionally, there is
variation in the socioecological environments of nonhuman primates that can be
compared and contrasted to those of humans. In this way, hypotheses concerning the
social or ecological pressures that may have led to the evolution of inequity aversion
can be more easily tested. To better elucidate the evolutionary pressures that may have
led to the emergence of inequity aversion, this study examined responses to unequal
reward distributions in three yet untested primate species, olive baboons, westernlowland gorillas, and white-cheeked gibbons, and one species that had been previously
tested for inequity aversion, orangutans.

Inequity Aversion in Humans

Previous studies have indicated that both adults and children exhibit negative
reactions to inequitable outcomes (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; McAuliffe et al., 2013), and
that inequity aversion occurs at an early age in humans (McAuliffe et al., 2013). At
about four years of age, children begin to respond negatively to disadvantageous
inequity, and at roughly eight years of age, children begin to react negatively to
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advantageous inequity (McAuliffe et al., 2013). This suggests that, in humans,
disadvantageous inequity aversion probably develops prior to advantageous inequity
aversion (McAuliffe et al., 2013). Disadvantageous inequity aversion also appears to be
more common than advantageous inequity aversion, as negative responses to lesser
rewards occur more often than negative responses to greater rewards (McAuliffe et al.,
2013).
While the above aspects of inequity aversion are consistent among humans,
there is also individual variation in responses to inequity among human subjects. For
instance, some studies have shown that males and females assign rewards and
distinguish fairness differently, indicating that responses to inequity may vary by sex
(Pruitt, 1985). Men, for example, will often take a competitive approach to equity
games, ensuring that final outcomes between negotiators are unequal; females, on the
other hand, more often take a cooperative approach, allowing final outcomes between
negotiators to remain relatively similar (Pruitt, 1985).
Peoples’ ideas of fairness also vary depending on their goals (Skitka, 2012). For
instance, people prefer to distribute equal allocations when given hypothetical scenarios
that require affiliation among workers (Leung, 1986). However, people prefer to receive
greater rewards than their partner in situations concerned with productivity (Skitka,
2012). When people are given a hypothetical situation in which work accentuates
productivity, they prefer an equitable, or profit-making, outcome in which everyone gets
rewarded based on the amount of work they put in (Leung, 1986). This could explain
why people prefer universities where academic salary distributions are dependent on
productivity levels (Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990).
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Recent research with children has shown that human responses to inequity
aversion also vary by culture. For instance, children 6 to 8 years of age living in the
United States or South Africa preferred to discard a resource rather than give the
resource to one individual; in this way, the children were maintaining equal rewards
across the subject and partner instead of creating an unequal reward distribution (Shaw
and Olson, 2012). However, children 6 to 7 years of age living in Uganda preferred to
create unequal distributions rather than discard a resource (Paulus, 2015).
Researchers have argued that cultures which are often exposed to environments
lacking in resources and which emphasize individual equality to a lesser degree are
less likely to respond negatively to reward inequality (Paulus, 2015).
In addition to culture, other social factors, such as relationship strength, have
been shown to influence inequity aversion. For example, humans’ decisions regarding
the distribution of payoffs are contingent upon the strength of relationship between the
subject and partner (Loewenstein et al., 1989). The study by Loewenstein and
colleagues (1989) indicated that humans respond more strongly to inequity when they
have a strong relationship with their social partner as opposed to a relatively weaker
relationship. People also tend to split distributions more evenly on occasions when
partners have spent more time together (Skitka, 2012). This may indicate that the value
of a particular relationship may be important in the maintenance of inequity aversion in
humans. Thus, the goal of maintaining a social relationship may cause people to
behave in what appears to be an unselfish manner. Inequity aversion, and particularly
advantageous inequity aversion, may therefore be a behavior humans use to avoid
relationship damage.
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Inequity Aversion in Nonhuman Primates

Although much research on inequity aversion has been completed with humans,
only a small number of primate species has been tested to elucidate the evolutionary
roots of humans’ sense of inequity. As of yet, only chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
(Brosnan et al., 2010), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) (Brosnan and de Waal,
2003), and macaques (Macaca mulatta and Macaca fascicularis) (Hopper et al., 2013;
Massen et al., 2012) have been shown to be inequity averse, while orangutans (Pongo
pygmaeus) (Brosnan et al., 2011), squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus and Saimiri
boliviensis) (Freeman et al., 2013; Talbot et al., 2010), owl monkeys (Aotus spp.)
(Freeman et al., 2013), marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) (Freeman et al., 2013), and
tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) (Neiworth et al., 2009) did not respond to inequitable
outcomes. Evidence concerning inequity aversion in bonobos (Pan paniscus) is
currently inconclusive, because some bonobos responded negatively to receiving
unequal rewards in one study, but the results were not statistically significant (Brauer et
al., 2009).
While some nonhuman primate species are inequity averse, they do not
respond negatively to inequitable outcomes when they are given rewards in the
absence of a task (i.e., something the primates must successfully complete in order be
rewarded) (Brosnan et al., 2010). To elicit a response to inequity, many researchers
have incorporated a token-exchange task into the experimental design; this requires
that the subject first accept and trade a harmless, inedible object before receiving a
food reward from an experimenter (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010;
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Brosnan et al., 2011; Chen and Santos, 2006; Freeman et al., 2013; Hopper et al.,
2013; Massen et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007). This tokenexchange procedure usually involves at least two conditions. In the equity condition, the
experimenter gives the subject and a social partner the same reward after both
individuals trade a non-food token for a designated food item (Brosnan, 2013). In the
inequity condition, the experimenter gives one individual a more preferred reward after
the token exchange and the other individual a less preferred reward after the inedible
token has been traded (Brosnan, 2013). In this paradigm, the experimenter observes
the response of a subject when they receive an unequal distribution and have no
control over their partner’s outcomes; the researcher then compares this reaction to the
same individual’s response after receiving an equal reward as their partner (Brosnan,
2013).
While most researchers now agree that a task is required to elicit a negative
response to inequity in nonhuman primates, there is still conflicting evidence about the
effects of effort, or how much an individual is required to work in order to receive a
reward. It is possible that nonhuman primates are more concerned with the quality or
amount of rewards received as opposed to the amount of work the individual had to
complete before receiving the rewards. For instance, some studies showed that
responses to inequity were not affected by the level of effort that was required to
complete a task (Brosnan et al., 2010; DeAngelo and Brosnan, 2013). Brosnan (2013)
stated that a response to inequity may not be affected by effort, and therefore sensitivity
to inequitable outcomes is due to differences in rewards earned rather than differences
in the amount of work completed.
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However, Brosnan and de Waal (2012) acknowledged that the combination of
unequal effort and inequitable distribution may enhance responses, as nonhuman
primates responded negatively to disadvantageous inequity more often when they were
required to complete a task involving greater effort. This claim was supported in one
study, in which capuchins were required to exchange a token either once or three times
before receiving a less preferred food reward than their social partner; the social
partner, in this case, always received a more preferred reward without having to
complete a task (van Wolkenten et al., 2007). In that study, the monkeys participated
in the task significantly less often when they were required to exchange a token three
times for a less preferred reward, as opposed to when they made only one exchange
for that same reward (van Wolkenten et al., 2007). An individual’s sensitivity to effort in
relation to rewards gained would make sense in terms of an animal’s foraging choices
in their natural environment. An animal would need to determine whether the benefits of
gaining access to specific food sources, such as those of preferred taste or those that
provide a greater abundance of food, would outweigh the costs of gaining the food,
such as predation risk, energy consumed by traveling, and competition with
conspecifics.

The Evolution of Inequity Aversion

As it appears as though negative responses to unequal reward distributions are
not unique to humans, it is important to understand how the trait may have evolved.
However, understanding the evolution of inequity aversion is a complicated process for
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a number of reasons. First, is often difficult to determine whether a behavioral trait,
including inequity aversion, is a homology (a trait shared by two or more species based
on descent that was inherited from a common ancestor) or a homoplasy (a trait shared
by two or more species based on similar function that evolved independently in different
lineages). This is because behavioral traits are not as apparent as morphological traits,
for example. Additionally, when considering whether or not a species is inequity averse,
it is important to note that the absence of a response to unequal distributions does not
equate to the absence of an ability to recognize disparity between resource allocations.
Observing an expected response in a species provides a clear demonstration that an
individual is capable of recognizing and responding to inequity; however, the lack of
performance does not necessarily indicate that they are not capable of doing so. An
individual may recognize that their outcome is unequal to a social partner’s outcome,
but they may still accept the unequal reward. Although behavioral traits, such as
inequity aversion, may be difficult to interpret, it is nonetheless imperative to try to
understand how inequity aversion evolved.
While humans and some nonhuman primate species show negative reactions to
inequitable outcomes, researchers have stated that inequity aversion does not appear
to be a homology for the order Primates, as not all primate species tested thus far have
exhibited an aversion to unequal rewards (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). However, only
a limited number of primate species have been tested for inequity aversion, and a
homology of the trait for the order Primates cannot be completely ruled out at this time.
It is therefore imperative to test additional primate species for the presence or absence
of inequity aversion. If later research supports the homology of inequity aversion in
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Primates, further analysis would have to address the common behavioral and cognitive
characteristics among all primate species that may have led to the evolution of a sense
of inequity. Furthermore, research would have to be completed in order to understand
why the behavior was secondarily lost in some primate species. Importantly, even if
inequity aversion is not homologous in the order Primates, the trait could still be a
homology for certain primate subgroups.
Researchers have suggested that a common origin of inequity aversion is
unlikely for the hominoid clade, as orangutans do not respond to inequitable outcomes
(Brosnan et al., 2011). However, it is still difficult to make this claim, because there is
conflicting evidence about bonobo inequity aversion (Brauer et al., 2006), and gorillas
and hylobatids, such as gibbons, have not been tested with an established inequity
paradigm. It is possible that bonobos, gorillas, and hylobatids respond negatively to
unequal outcomes, which could indicate that the last common ancestor of extant
hominoids already possessed inequity aversion, and orangutans lost it secondarily,
perhaps due to their semi-solitary nature.
Further assessments have been made about the evolution of inequity aversion
among additional primate subgroups, as well. Whether inequity aversion is a homology
in the superfamily Cercopithecoidea is currently unknown, because the only Old World
monkey genus that has yet been tested is Macaca (Hopper et al., 2013; Massen et al.,
2012). The evolution of inequity aversion in the parvorder Platyrrhini is a little clearer,
considering more species in this subgroup have been tested. It appears as though
inequity aversion is not homologous in New World monkeys, because capuchin
monkeys do respond negatively to inequity, whereas marmosets, tamarins, squirrel
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monkeys, and owl monkeys do not (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014). However, the
apparent absence of inequity aversion in callitrichids, squirrel monkeys, and owl
monkeys could be attributed to the limited amount of data that has been collected for
these species. Furthermore, the absence of data on strepsirrhines and tarsiers renders
the evolution of inequity aversion even more nebulous.
If inequity aversion is not homologous in Primates, then this trait evolved
independently multiple times during the evolutionary history of this group. Such
independent evolution of inequity aversion would suggest that similar evolutionary
pressures led to convergent solutions in distantly related species. In this context, the
importance of testing additional primate species becomes even more apparent.
Researchers agree that regardless of whether inequity aversion is homologous
or homoplastic, this behavioral trait most likely evolved in different species in a series of
stages (Chen and Santos, 2006; Brosnan, 2013). The presumption is that each stage
promoted the reproductive success and/or the survival of individuals. After interpreting
Brosnan’s explanation of inequity aversion, Chen and Santos (2006) suggested that the
first stage involves the evolution of an organism’s cognitive ability to realize that the
value of resources of others can diverge from the value of the individual’s own
resources. The second stage is the evolution of an organism’s capability of responding
to unequal outcomes (Chen and Santos, 2006). The third and final stage, according to
Chen and Santos (2006), is the organism’s tendency to give up their own rewards in
order to create a more equal reward distribution.
However, at least one significant stage in the evolution of inequity aversion is
omitted from this scheme. Before an organism can realize that their own rewards differ
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from those of another individual, that organism must first distinguish the self from the
other. For instance, Mitchell (2015) argued that an organism must recognize that their
body and behaviors are separate from those of their conspecifics, and the organism
must distinguish when their body movements and behaviors either resemble or differ
from the movements and behaviors of others. Only then can the organism complete
stages one through three as suggested by Chen and Santos (2006).
While the ultimate causes of inequity aversion (those which explain how and why
the trait came to be) are of greatest interest to most researchers, it is also important to
understand the proximate causes of inequity aversion (those which explain the
mechanisms facilitating an individual to exhibit the behavior). Therefore, the aim of this
thesis is not to simply explain the evolution of inequity aversion at the ultimate level, but
is rather to better understand the underlying mechanisms of inequity aversion (at the
proximate level).
If inequity aversion is not a homologous trait for the order Primates, then it must
be considered as to why this trait appears in certain primate species and not others.
Why would inequity aversion evolve separately several times in evolutionary history?
What function does inequity aversion fulfill? If inequity aversion is a homplastic trait for
the order Primates, this allows for the testing of hypotheses regarding the evolution of
this trait, with each lineage or subgroup acting as a contrast for the others. If inequity
aversion is homplastic within primate subgroups, such as at the superfamily, family, or
genus level, hypotheses for the evolution of inequity aversion should focus on species’
socioecological environment.
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Inequity, Social Organization, and Cooperation
It is possible that inequity aversion evolved in order to maintain cooperative
relationships among group members (Brauer et al., 2006; Brosnan, 2013; Brosnan and
de Waal, 2012; Massen et al., 2012; Skitka, 2012; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), which
would be plausible considering that so far only species that live in large, complex
societies and which cooperate with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group members have
been shown to respond negatively to unequal rewards (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014).
For example, capuchin monkeys, macaques, and chimpanzees, all species which are
inequity averse, rely on the cooperation of non-kin group members for forming coalition
alliances in aggressive situations (Higham and Maestripieri, 2010; Nishida, 1983; Perry,
1996; van Noordwijk and van Schaik, 1985). Chimpanzees also show cooperative
mate-guarding (Watts, 1998), cooperative hunting (Boesch, 1994), and meat-sharing
(Mitani and Watts, 2001) with non-kin conspecifics. Additionally, capuchin monkeys
cooperate to gain food resources (Rose, 1997) and show food-sharing behavior (Perry
and Rose, 1994) with non-kin individuals.
Furthermore, it is fairly easy to see how inequity aversion may have evolved to
increase cooperation and social interaction among group members in species where
individuals have repeated interactions, long-term relationships, mutual benefits, and
dependency with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group members. Massen and
colleagues (2012) suggested that individuals who cooperate with conspecifics may
evade unequal outcomes by using complex decision-making abilities to monitor the
outcomes of social partners. If one individual is consistently receiving fewer benefits
than their cooperative partner, that individual may cancel their cooperative relationship
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with that particular partner, assuming the individual recognized the disparity in their
outcomes. This is because cooperative partners may only want to invest in cooperation
if the rewards are equally beneficial. Thus, an awareness of equal sharing is useful for
maintaining a high level of cooperativeness (Massen et al., 2012).
Similarly, it has been suggested that aversive reactions to inequity may have
evolved as a way to determine the reliability of a potential social partner (Brosnan,
2013; Brosnan and de Waal, 2012; Brosnan et al., 2011), in which individuals test
whether social partners will give as equally as they receive. For instance, an interest in
another’s well-being could enhance an individual’s reputation of being a “fair” partner
and may ensure later reciprocity in the individual’s favor (Brosnan, 2013). Research
with capuchin monkeys supports this idea, as the monkeys appear to recognize and
anticipate future necessary cooperation with their partners (Brosnan, 2013). However,
due to the limited data regarding the relationship between inequity aversion and future
cooperation, this theoretical explanation needs to be further explored before definitive
conclusions can be made.
While there is strong evidence that inequity aversion evolved in tandem with an
increase in cooperative relationships, it is less clear why cooperative breeders such as
marmosets (Freeman et al., 2013) and tamarins (Neiworth et al., 2009) would not be
inequity averse. Species in which both the male and female participate in rearing
offspring obviously must socially cooperate with one another (Brosnan, 2013).
However, these species do not appear to be inequity averse, perhaps because
responding to unequal outcomes is costly to those with close, exclusive social
relationships (Brosnan, 2013; DeAngelo and Brosnan, 2013). This is plausible because
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inequity aversion is assumed to be a method for determining the value of a social
partner. However, switching partners is more costly in pair-bonded species who have
already invested significant time and resources into their partnerships; therefore,
responding to inequitable outcomes would be less beneficial for these individuals
(Brosnan, 2013). It has been predicted that pair-living partners with a newly formed
relationship are more likely to respond negatively to unequal outcomes than partners
with a longer relationship history, because replacing a social partner is more difficult
and costly for the latter individuals (DeAngelo and Brosnan, 2013). This may explain
why pair-bonded species, such as gibbons, do sometimes switch social partners
(Reichard, 1995).
Inequity aversion may be a trait that is only maintained where there are direct
fitness consequences of maintaining it. Those who are inequity averse should enjoy
higher fitness than those who are not when an absence of the trait is consequential to
one’s survival or opportunity to reproduce. Perhaps in species where individuals have
the opportunity to cooperate with multiple non-kin conspecifics, an individual receives
greater fitness benefits from choosing the conspecific that provides the most equal
partnership. However, species which typically only cooperate with kin or few non-kin
individuals do not benefit from reacting negatively to unequal resource distributions.

Alternative Hypothesis for the Evolution of Inequity Aversion
Although it is plausible that inequity aversion evolved as a response to
cooperation among non-kin group members, alternative hypotheses have been
proposed. For example, Chen and Santos (2006) criticized Brosnan’s hypothesis that
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suggested that the underlying mechanisms of inequity are related to sociality; they
argued that Brosan’s approach is too domain-specific, or too narrow. Chen and Santos
(2006) instead proposed that inequity aversion occurs in contexts irrespective of a
social domain.
It was hypothesized that a negative response to unequal outcomes is a reply to a
violation of previous expectations (Chen and Santos, 2006), known as “contrast effects”
(Brosnan and de Waal, 2012), “frustration effects” (Roma et al., 2006), or the “foodexpectation hypothesis” (Brauer et al., 2006). In these models, an animal expects to
receive a reward that they have previously been shown or have previously been given.
When the animal does not receive that expected reward, they respond negatively. In
compliance with the “food-expectation hypothesis” (Brauer et al., 2006), inequity
aversion should occur if expectations are violated, regardless of the presence or
absence of a social partner.
Chen and Santos (2006) therefore hypothesized that inequity aversion evolved in
response to a more general environment based on a reference-point that may or may
not have a social component. They suggested that one apparent evolutionary
advantage to recognizing another individual’s rewards is to determine whether others
living in the same environment are receiving more payoffs than one’s own
environmental rewards (Chen and Santos, 2006). Chen and Santos (2006) theorized
that understanding the payoffs of others could indicate important changes occurring in
the organism’s environment that may affect an individual’s behavior, especially
regarding feeding patterns. For example, an animal who recognizes that other
individuals receive better food from a shared environment should more actively seek
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this food themselves, regardless of the presence or absence of cooperative partners
(Chen and Santos, 2006). However, it could be argued that as long as an individual’s
environmental needs are met, there is no benefit to knowing whether their group
members are gaining more “payoffs” from their environment.
It must be considered that the hypothesis proposed by Chen and Santos is not
entirely plausible as currently stated, and it remains rather theoretical, as it is difficult to
test empirically. For example, environmental resources are constantly changing in
response to several variables, including season, temperature, rainfall patterns, and
sometimes environmental destruction by humans. Similarly, natural resources, such as
food items, are almost always different from one another in some way, even when food
rewards are of the same species. For instance, it seems highly unlikely that two fruits
even on the same tree will ever have the exact same size, shape, density, ripeness,
and nutritional content. Similarly, the internal stage of the individual, such as hunger or
satiation, in addition to other factors—such as dominance status, distance to food
sources, the presence of competing conspecifics, and the presence of predators—play
into an individual’s decision to leave a food source in search for a better resource. The
consequence of the immense variation in ecological variables is that primates should be
constantly changing their expectations to fit their environment. An animal can almost
never expect to receive the same exact food item that the individual received in the
past, and because of this, should not react negatively a priori when a current reward
does not match those of past rewards.
Brosnan and de Waal (2012) also countered the argument that negative
responses to unequal rewards are due to contrast effects rather than social
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expectations. Contradicting evidence to the claim of contrast effects has been shown
experimentally for several species which are inequity averse (Brosnan and de Waal,
2012). For instance, nonhuman primates refused to participate in a task with a social
partner when the subject received a less preferred reward than their partner; however,
in the absence of a social partner, these same animals fail to respond negatively after
receiving a different reward than one previously shown to them (Brosnan and de Waal,
2012). If the primates were only responding to the contrast between past and present
rewards, these animals should have responded negatively in both scenarios.
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CHAPTER 2

STUDY AIMS

As the study of inequity aversion is rather recent in primatology, there is still
much to learn about the mechanisms and function that govern this behavior. An
obvious need is to increase the number of primate species tested for inequity aversion
under controlled conditions. In order to better understand the evolution of inequity
aversion, this study aimed to examine this phenomenon in three yet untested primate
genera. This study also included a species which has been previously tested in order
to check for consistency in intraspecific responses to inequity and to provide validity for
this study’s methods. While an established inequity paradigm (Brosnan and de Waal,
2003) was used to allow for easier comparison of behavioral responses across studies,
a new test condition was added to provide a better understanding of species’ responses
to unequal reward distributions.

Species Selection

One of the most pertinent areas of future research pertaining to the expansion of
nonhuman primate inequity studies is to test the remaining ape species to better
understand the behavior’s prevalence among hominoids. This includes studying
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individuals of the family Hylobatidae and those of the genus Gorilla, as little is known
about either group’s responses to inequity. Although it appears as though not all
primates in the superfamily Hominoidea are inequity averse (Brosnan et al., 2011),
studying hylobatids and gorillas could increase the understanding of how a species’
socioecological environment plays a role in inequity aversion. Similarly, if both
hylobatids and gorillas do respond negatively to unequal outcomes, it could indicate
that the last common ancestor of extant hominoids already possessed the capacity for
inequity aversion, and orangutans may have lost this ability secondarily.
As macaques are so far the only Old World monkeys that have been tested in
regards to inequity aversion (Hopper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012), completing
similar inequity experiments on additional Old World monkeys, such as baboons of the
genus Papio, is of paramount importance for understanding the evolutionary roots of
inequity aversion. Studies of baboons can help to determine possible sociecological
factors driving inequity responses in humans and nonhuman animals. Studying
baboons also puts us one step closer to understanding whether or not there could be
homology of inequity aversion in Cercopithecoidea.
While orangutans have been tested for inequity aversion in one study, it is
important to include this species in additional studies on this topic for a number of
reasons. As of yet, orangutans are the only ape species that has been definitively
declared as non-aversive to unequal distributions. It is therefore important to determine
whether the absence of inequity aversion in the small number of orangutans tested
(N=5; Brosnan et al., 2011) is anomalous or whether the absence of the behavior is
characteristic of the species as a whole. Additionally, including a species already tested
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for inequity aversion provides a source of validation for the research methods, as
observed behaviors of this species can be compared across studies.
Orangutans, hylobaitds, gorillas, and baboons are good model species for the
study of inequity aversion not only due to these groups’ phylogenetic relationship with
previously tested species, but also due to the socioecological differences among them.
Researchers agree that it is necessary to increase our knowledge about the similarities
and differences of inequity responses in socially cooperative species as opposed to
those which do not typically cooperate with non-kin group members (Brosnan and de
Waal, 2012). Testing species which vary in the amount of cooperation that occurs
among conspecifics would be beneficial for understanding the social implications of
inequity aversion.
Orangutans, gibbons, gorillas, and baboons are excellent model species to
determine the relationship between species cooperation and inequity aversion.
Orangutans are considered solitary foragers which have only brief social interactions
with non-kin conspecifics (Mitani et al., 1991; te Boekhorst et al., 1990). Hylobatids
typically live in bonded pairs with dependent offspring (Reichard and Boesch, 2003;
Palombit 1996). Gorillas often live in family groups averaging nine individuals
(Yamagiwa et al., 2003), consisting of all adult males or one or two males and multiple
females (Doran and McNeilage, 1998). Baboons of the genus Papio are characterized
by high sociality as expressed in their multi-male, multi-female social organization,
averaging between 15 and 150 individuals (Barton et al, 1996; Dunbar and Dunbar,
1974; Ray and Sapolsky, 1992; Rowel, 1966), Due to the varied social interactions
these four primate groups have with non-kin group members, testing orangutans,
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hylobatids, gorillas, and baboons would make an excellent comparison for
understanding the social influences driving inequity aversion.

Adding to the Current Procedural Paradigm

In order to allow for cross-species comparison of nonhuman primates, it is
important to use similar procedures with each species tested (Brosnan and de Waal,
2012). As the majority of studies investigating inequity aversion involve a tokenexchange or targeting paradigm (Brosnan et al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan
and de Waal, 2005; Freeman et al., 2013; Hooper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012; van
Wolkenten et al., 2007), it would beneficial to mimic these methods when examining
inequity in a species that has yet to be tested. To control for contrast effects, a contrast
condition should be used in which the subject and partner complete a task and are both
given a less-preferred reward than the one previously shown to them, as prior studies
have done (Brosnan, 2013).
While it is important to use procedures similar to those used in previous inequity
aversion studies in order to allow for cross-species comparison, it is equally necessary
to explore how responses to inequity vary with differences in methodology (Brosnan
and de Waal, 2012). Therefore, it would be beneficial for researchers to use an
established inequity paradigm involving a task (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003), while
adding one procedure not yet tested in nonhuman primates. As it appears as though
differences in quantitative, as opposed to qualitative, reward distributions have not been
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analyzed in relation to nonhuman primate inequity aversion, this would be a valuable
addition to future experimental procedures.
While many species clearly demonstrate their aversion to unequal qualitative
distributions (Brosnan et al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003;
Chen and Santos, 2006; Freeman et al., 2013; Hooper et al., 2013; Massen et al.,
2012; Roma et al., 2006; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), it would be
interesting to see whether individuals respond negatively to receiving a lesser amount
of the same food rewards than a social partner. It is obvious that recognizing the type of
food obtained by oneself and one’s conspecific is important in an animal’s natural
environment, as different foods cause animals to be more satiated than others.
However, recognizing the abundance or scarcity of food gained by social partners
compared to themselves seems equally, if not more, important for an animal’s survival.
If it is assumed that inequity aversion evolved in response to a species’ ecological
environment, it is essential to assess whether negative responses to unequal
quantitative distributions exist in primate species.
Although adding a difference in quantitative distributions to the procedure is
clearly important for the study of inequity aversion, there are several aspects one must
consider before doing so. For instance, some rewards may be interpreted as so high in
value that receiving a smaller amount of a high-value reward than a conspecific partner
may not elicit a negative response. Therefore, distributing different amounts of the lowvalue reward would be a better indicator of the role quantity plays in response to
unequal outcomes.
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Another important consideration to make before introducing a quantitative
component into the current inequity paradigm is whether or not nonhuman primates are
able to recognize numerical differences in resources. Researchers have found that
several nonhuman primate species are able to distinguish between two sets of items
that differ numerically, including chimpanzees (Beran, 2001; Beran et al., 2008; Boysen
and Berntson, 1995; Hanus and Call, 2007), bonobos (Hanus and Call, 2007), rhesus
macaques (Beran, 2007; Brannon and Terrace), hamadryas baboons (Smith et al.,
2003), and squirrel monkeys (Smith et al., 2003). Research has also suggested that
nonhuman primates understand numerosity used in naturalistic contexts, such as vocal
communication (Kitchen, 2004) and intergroup conflict (Wilson et al., 2001).
Importantly, all nonhuman primate groups tested in this study have been shown
to have numerical abilities. For instance, in one study, gorillas and orangutans were
able to select the larger of two amounts of the same food item when the quantities were
presented at the same time and when the quantities were presented one after the other
(Hanus and Call, 2007). Similarly, gibbons were able to select the larger of two
quantities at a greater percentage than expected by chance when the ratio between
quantities was 4/3, 3/2, 5/3, or 5/2 (Yocum, 2010). In another study, olive baboons were
able to distinguish between two small amounts of food (both less than four items), two
large amounts of food (both greater than four items), and between one small amount
and one large amount of food (Barnard et al., 2013).
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Hypotheses and Predictions

The current consensus among most scholars researching inequity aversion is
that a negative response to inequitable outcomes evolved in tandem with an increase in
cooperative relationships among conspecifics (Brosnan and de Waal, 2012; Brosnan et
al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Freeman et al., 2013;
Hooper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al.,
2007). Therefore, hypotheses can be made about the presence or absence of inequity
aversion in those primate species that have yet to be studied. It was hypothesized that
“social” species would show aversive reactions to disadvantageous inequitable
outcomes, whereas “semi-social” species would not. “Social” species were defined here
as those which cooperate with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group members and have
an average group size consisting of greater than four individuals. “Semi-social” species
were considered to be those which do not cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-bonded
conspecifics and have average group sizes including four or fewer individuals.
Additionally, predictions can be made about nonhuman primate responses to
advantageous inequity aversion. Studies of human inequity aversion have shown that
humans respond more strongly to inequity when they have a strong relationship with
their social partner (Loewenstein et al., 1989) and when partners have spent more time
together (Skitka, 2012). Therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with a strong
relationship with their social partner, who were members of species which cooperate
with non-kin group members, would show aversive reactions to advantageous
inequitable outcomes.
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Lastly, it was predicted that none of the nonhuman primate species tested would
exhibit contrast effects. This is because environmental resources and an animal’s
internal state are constantly changing in response to several variables, and food items
in a natural environment are almost always different from one another in some way,
even when food rewards are of the same species. In the wild, an animal can almost
never expect to receive the same exact food item that the individual received in the
past, and because of this, should not react negatively a priori when a current reward
does not match those of past rewards. Additionally, captive nonhuman primates often
receive food items that differ from those once shown or given to them, and should
therefore not react negatively to receiving a reward different from one previously given
to them.
The following predictions can then be made following the hypotheses discussed
above:

Hypothesis 1: Primate species which typically cooperate with non-kin and non-pairbonded group members will show aversive reactions to disadvantageous inequitable
outcomes, whereas primate species which do not cooperate with non-kin, non-pairbonded conspecifics will not.
Predictions:
1a) Orangutans will not respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task.
1b) Hylobatids will not respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task.
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1c) Gorillas will respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than their
social partner after both individuals complete the same task.
1d) Baboons will respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than their
social partner after both individuals complete the same task.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals which have a strong relationship with their social partner and
are members of species which cooperates with non-kin group members will show
aversive reactions to advantageous inequitable outcomes; those individuals which do
not have a strong relationship with their social partner and/or are not members of a
species which cooperates with non-kin group members will not.
Predictions:
2a) Orangutans will not respond negatively after receiving a greater reward than
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task.
2b) Hylobatids will not respond negatively after receiving a greater reward than
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task.
2c) Gorillas will respond negatively after receiving a greater reward than their
social partner after both individuals complete the same task. (This prediction
is based on the fact that the pair of gorillas tested are full-siblings, have lived
together for 13 years, and presumably, have a strong social relationship.)
2d) Baboons will not respond negatively after receiving a greater reward than
their social partner after both individuals complete the same task. (This
prediction is based on the fact that none of the baboons tested had prior
contact with the individual they were paired with until the onset of this study;
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therefore, the baboon subjects did not presumably have strong social
relationships with their partners.)

Hypothesis 3: Nonhuman primates which often receive rewards that differ from previous
rewards given to them will not exhibit contrast effects.
Predictions:
3a) Orangutans will not respond negatively to receiving a different reward than
one that was previously shown to them.
3b) Hylobatids will not respond negatively to receiving a different reward than
one that was previously shown to them.
3c) Gorillas will not respond negatively to receiving a different reward than one
that was previously shown to them.
3d) Baboons will not respond negatively to receiving a different reward than one
that was previously shown to them.

29

CHAPTER 3

METHODS

Subjects and Study Locations

Subjects included twelve olive baboons (Papio anubis), two western-lowland
gorillas (Gorilla gorilla), four orangutans (Pongo spp.), and two white-cheeked gibbons
(Nomascus leucogenys). All nonhuman primate subjects were novel to inequity testing.
No subject was deprived of food or water, which was available ad libitum to all subjects
during experimentation. Additionally, subjects were given two more extensive meals per
day, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. With the exception of small food
rewards given during experimentation, no changes to the subjects’ regular feeding
schedules or diet were made prior to, during, or after testing. This study was approved
by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of Southern Illinois University
Carbondale (IACUC 15-008), the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of
Texas Biomedical Research Institute (IACUC 1495 PC 0), and the Institutional Animal
Care and Use Committee of Smithsonian National Zoological Park (NZP-IACUC 15-17).
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Baboons
During the study, all twelve olive baboon subjects were temporarily individually
housed in the veterinary clinic at the Southwest National Primate Research Center
(SNPRC) in San Antonio, Texas. Baboons were housed in hanging cages,
approximately 1 x 1.2 m in size, with the exception of one male subject housed in a
cage stationed on the ground that was approximately 1.5 x 1.8 m in size (Table 2). At
the initiation of the study, ten of the baboon subjects had been located in the veterinary
clinic for 3 to 31 days due to minor illness and/or injury (Table 2). The remaining two
baboons had been located in the clinic for 78 and 85 days respectively, and these two
individuals formed a pair. Importantly, while the amount of time located in the clinic
varied by individual, baboons were only placed next to their partners at the initiation of
the study, and therefore, pairs were exposed to each other for the same amount of
time. Prior to and following clinic visits, baboon subjects were housed in social groups
comprised of between 4 and 14 individuals (Table 1).
To ensure that baboons’ familiarity with their social partner did not affect the
baboon’s performance, these subjects were tested in pairs consisting of two individuals
from different social groups. All pairs remained consistent throughout all trials and test
sessions. Male subjects were each tested with another male subject, and female
subjects were each tested with another female subject. This was because male
subjects were located in one room containing only male baboons, and female subjects
were located in a separate room containing only female baboons. This procedure also
mimicked additional studies of nonhuman primate inequity aversion, in which male
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subjects were tested only with other males, and female subjects were tested only with
other females (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2010).
During training and test sessions, baboon pairs were located in separate,
adjacent cages placed approximately 15 cm apart. Cage sides were comprised of
vertical bars spaced approximately 7 cm apart, indicating that the baboons in each pair
were visible to one another at all times. Because the baboons have been reported by
the facility as being both familiar and comfortable with the isolation cages, especially
when receiving food rewards, this set-up was not expected to significantly influence the
subjects’ behavior.

Apes
Two western-lowland gorillas, four orangutans, and two white-cheeked gibbons
were housed in social groups at the Smithsonian National Zoological Park (NZP) in
Washington, D.C. One gorilla social group was tested, which consisted of two fullsibling black-back males. Two orangutan social groups were tested, which each
included one mating pair of orangutans. One gibbon social group was tested, which
consisted of one mating pair of gibbons.
Because gorilla, orangutan, and gibbon subjects were limited, individuals of
these species were tested in pairs consisting of two individuals from the same social
group. All pairs remained consistent throughout all trials and test sessions. Gorillas,
orangutans, and gibbons were temporarily separated from their partner into adjacent
cages prior to each training and test session. Mesh doors separated the adjacent
enclosures, and therefore, subjects were visible to one another for the duration of
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experimentation. Following each session, the subjects were reintroduced to their group
mate. Separating subjects from their social partners allowed for more control over the
experimental conditions and prevented aggressive interactions between group mates
during testing. Importantly, gorilla and orangutan subjects separate daily into individual
cages for their afternoon meals, so separating from their social partners was not
unusual. Additionally, the gorilla, orangutan, and gibbon subjects all separated from one
another willingly and showed no signs of stress due to separation. Therefore, this setup was not expected to significantly influence the subjects’ behavior.

Food Preference Tests

Prior to inequity testing, food preference tests were completed in order to
determine which food items each primate pair considered to be high and low-value
rewards. A dichotomous choice test (Brosnan and de Waal, 2004a, b) was used in
which an assortment of foods was sequentially offered to the subjects, two food items
at a time. All food items were preapproved by the facilities’ administrations and were
foods that the subjects were familiar with prior to this study.

Baboons
For food preference tests with baboons, the experimenter began by holding a
piece of carrot (approximately 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm) in one hand and piece of grape
(approximately 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm) in the other hand, keeping their hands
centered on the primate subject and approximately 30 cm apart. The experimenter then
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stepped forward approximately 30 cm from the first subject’s cage. The baboon subject
was required to gesture with their hand, foot, or head toward one of the two food items,
at which point the experimenter handed the baboon the food item that was gestured
toward by the subject (Brosnan and de Waal, 2004). The experimenter marked which
food item the subject gestured toward and then repeated this process with the second
subject. To control for side biases, the experimenter alternated food items between
their left and right hands between trials (Brosnan et al., 2010).
This food preference test was completed a total of 5 times, followed by 5 trials of
carrot vs. mini marshmallow and 5 trials of grape vs. mini marshmallow (15 trials per
subject). The food item that was chosen the most by the pair of baboons was marked
as the high-value food; the food that was chosen the least was considered the lowvalue food. Each baboon pair had to prefer the high-value food item over the low-value
food item in at least 80% of the trials in order to move on with experimentation (Brosnan
et al., 2010).
The experimenter then offered each baboon subject 5 successive pieces of the
low-value food to ensure that the subjects were willing to eat several consecutive pieces
of this food item. This was important, because each subject would be required to eat
several successive pieces of this food item during inequity testing. This step ensured
that any negative reaction by a baboon subject after receiving the low-value food
reward during inequity tests would be due to an aversion to the reward distribution and
not to the dislike of the food item itself.
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Apes
Food preference tests with gorillas, orangutans, and gibbons were similar to
those completed with baboons, with the exception of a few procedural changes. To
ensure that the ape subjects’ preferences would not change, the food preference tests
were completed over a two-day period. In initial food preference tests, subjects
appeared to maintain side biases, even after implementing the changing of foods from
one hand to the other between trials. Therefore, to further avoid side biases, a
computerized randomizer was used to determine in which hand the experimenter would
hold each food item during each trial (as opposed to a continuous right-then-left
pattern).
When testing apes, the experimenter began by holding the two food items
approximately 2.5 cm apart for about 1 s and then would separate the two items to
approximately 30 cm apart. Each ape subject was exposed to 10 trials of each food
preference test (30 trials per day and 60 trials total). All gorilla, orangutan, and gibbon
subjects were also required to eat 15 consecutive pieces of the low-value food item, as
each subject would be required to eat this amount during inequity testing.
Food items offered to ape subjects during food preference tests varied by
species according to previous food preferences documented by the apes’ caregivers.
Gorillas completed food preference trials with apple vs. carrot, apple vs. grape, and
carrot vs. grape. Orangutans were offered apple vs. orange, apple vs. grape, and
orange vs. grape during food preference tests. Gibbons completed food preference
tests with apple vs. melon, apple vs. grape, and melon vs. grape. All food items for
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gorillas and orangutans were approximately 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm in size. All food
items for gibbons were approximately 6 mm x 6 mm x 3 mm in size.

Training

Prior to inequity testing, all nonhuman primate subjects were trained to complete
a task. Following task completion during training sessions, the experimenter rewarded
baboon subjects with a 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm piece of apple, gorilla subjects with a
2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x 3 mm piece of banana, orangutan subjects with a 2.5 cm x 2.5 cm x
3 mm piece of papaya, and gibbon subjects with a 6 mm x 6 mm x 3 mm piece of
banana. These food items were used only during training sessions for each species to
ensure that the subjects did not become biased toward the food item used for training
(Brosnan et al., 2010). To avoid side biases, the experimenter alternated between trials
which hand held the target or token and which hand held the food reward (Brosnan et
al., 2010).

Baboons and Gibbons
Baboons and gibbons were trained to accomplish a targeting task which required
each subject to hold a designated target for 1 s and then release the target (Freeman et
al., 2013). The target used for baboons was a piece of curved PVC pipe (approximately
7.5 cm long and 3.5 cm wide) with a circular chain running through the opening of the
pipe which attached to a clip at the opposite end. This item was approved and provided
by SNPRC. The target used for gibbon subjects was a small piece of bamboo
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(approximately 7.5 cm long and 6 mm wide), which was approved and provided by
NZP.
For baboons, the experimenter stepped up to the subject’s cage with the target
in one hand and the piece of banana visible to the subject in the other hand. The
experimenter then clipped the target onto the middle of the cage at the subject’s eye
level, and then stepped back. The baboon was given 30 s to approach and hold the
target with their hand or foot for 1 s. When the subject removed their hand or foot from
the target, the experimenter handed the baboon a piece of apple. The experimenter
then moved on to the second subject in the pair and repeated the procedure. The
experimenter alternated between individuals in the pair, completing 10 trials with each
subject. Each baboon subject was required to complete 8 of 10 targeting tasks before
moving on to testing sessions.
For gibbons, the experimenter stepped up to the subject’s enclosure, held one
end of the bamboo in one hand and the piece of banana visible to the subject in the
other hand. The experimenter then placed the opposite end of the bamboo into the
enclosure mesh at the subject’s waist level (or what would be waist level if the subject
was not sitting at the start of the trial). The gibbon was given 30 s to approach and hold
the target with their hand or foot for 1 s. When the subject removed their hand or foot
from the target, the experimenter handed them a piece of banana. The experimenter
then moved on to the second subject in the pair and repeated the procedure. The
experimenter alternated between individuals in the pair, completing 15 trials with each
subject. Each gibbon subject was required to complete 12 of 15 targeting tasks before
moving on to testing sessions.
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Gorillas and Orangutans
Gorilla and orangutan subjects completed a token-exchange task during training
sessions, which required each subject to trade a piece of bamboo (approximately 15 cm
long and 3.5 cm wide) with an experimenter. The bamboo tokens were approved and
provided by NZP. For the token-exchange task, the experimenter stepped up to the
subject’s enclosure holding one end of the bamboo in one hand and a piece of banana
(for gorillas) or papaya (for orangutans) visible to the subject in the other hand. The
experimenter then placed the opposite end of the bamboo into the enclosure at the
subject’s waist level (or what would be waist level if the subject was not sitting at the
start of the trial). Each subject was given 30 s to take the piece of bamboo from the
experimenter, hold onto it for 1 s, and then give it back to the experimenter through the
enclosure mesh. When the subject completed this task, the experimenter handed the
ape a piece of banana (for gorillas) or papaya (for orangutans). The experimenter then
moved on to the second subject in the pair and repeated the procedure. The
experimenter alternated between individuals in the pair, completing 15 trials with each
subject. Each gorilla and orangutan subject was required to complete 12 of 15 tokenexchange tasks before moving on to testing sessions.

Testing

Each primate participated in a series of five tests (described below), completing
30 trials (20 trials for baboons) as the role of the subject (Session 1) and 30 trials (20
trials for baboons) as the role of the partner (Session 2) for each test. The subject and
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partner were visible to one another through either cage bars (baboons) or enclosure
mesh (apes) during all testing sessions, indicating that each subject had the opportunity
to see which food reward their partner received. During each test, high and low-value
rewards were visible through clear containers to both the subject and partner at all
times (Brosnan et al., 2011).
During each trial, the partner completed the task in exchange for a food reward
prior to the subject; whether each primate began as the subject or partner was
randomized (Brosnan et al., 2010). The first exchange between the partner and the
experimenter constituted the first trial of the session. The first exchange between the
subject and the experimenter represented the second trial of the session. This indicates
that each individual completed 15 tasks (10 tasks for baboons) per session. For each
trial, each primate had 30 seconds to complete the task. If the task was completed
within the 30 seconds, the experimenter handed the primate a food reward. If the task
was not completed within 30 seconds, the experimenter did not give that primate a food
reward and instead moved on to the second individual in the pair. For each pair of
primates, all tests described below occurred on separate days, meaning that no
individual completed more than one test per day.
Following each trial, each primate’s reaction after completing a task for a food
reward was marked as either negative or positive. If the primate stopped participating in
the task, did not take the reward from the experimenter, or took the reward but did not
eat it, the experimenter considered the reaction to be a reward rejection, or a negative
response (Brosnan et al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003;
Freeman et al., 2013; Hooper et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 2011; van
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Wolkenten et al., 2007). If the primate continued to participate in task completion and
ate the food reward, the reaction was marked as positive for that trial (Brosnan et al.,
2010; Brosnan et al., 2011; Brosnan and de Waal, 2003; Freeman et al., 2013; Hooper
et al., 2013; Massen et al., 2012; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007).
Following each trial, the experimenter recorded on data sheets whether the responses
of the subjects and partners were negative or positive.
The experimenter also recorded ad libitum instances of abnormal and aggressive
behavior observed for the subject and partner. Abnormal behaviors included pacing, in
which an individual moves back and forth in the enclosure for at least two cycles, selfbiting, in which an individual bites a part of their own body (Lutz et al., 2003), and cagelicking, in which an individual licks the sides, ceiling, or floor of the enclosure.
Aggressive behaviors included yawning, in which an individual opens their mouth to
display their teeth (Maestripieri et al., 1992) and cage-banging, in which an individual
uses a body part (usually their hands, feet, or head) to apply excessive force to the
walls, ceiling, or floor of the enclosure. After all behaviors were recorded for the trial, the
next trial immediately followed.

Test 1: Testing for Contrast Effects
To test for contrast effects, or individual expectations (Chen and Santos, 2006),
each pair of primates completed two sessions consisting of 30 trials each (20 trials
each for baboons). For the first session, both the subject and partner were shown a
high-value reward prior to task completion but were given a low-value reward following
task completion. For the second session, both the subject and partner were shown a
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large-quantity reward (three pieces of low-value food) prior to task completion but were
given a small-quantity reward (one piece of low-value food) following task completion.

Test 2: Equitable Reward Quality
Prior to inequitable quality testing, each pair of primates completed two control
sessions, in which both the subject and partner received the same reward. In the first
control session, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were completed in which the subject
and partner alternated completing a task for a low-value food reward (named the lowvalue control). In the second control session, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were
completed in which the subject and partner alternated completing a task for a highvalue food reward (named the high-value control). Because the reward quality was
increasing across control sessions, individual expectations were not expected to affect
the results.

Test 3: Inequitable Reward Quality
In the inequity-quality test, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were completed in
which the subject and partner alternated completing a task for a food reward. However,
the partner always received the high-value food reward after task completion, and the
subject always received the low-value food reward after task completion. To test for
disadvantageous inequity aversion, the subjects’ responses to this test were compared
to their responses in the low-value control; to test for advantageous inequity aversion,
the partner’s responses to this test were compared to their responses in the high-value
control (Brosnan et al., 2010).
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Test 4: Equitable Reward Quantity
Prior to inequitable quantity testing, each pair of primates completed two control
sessions, in which both the subject and partner received the same amount of rewards.
In the first control session, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were completed in which the
subject and partner alternated completing a task for one low-value food reward (named
the small-quantity control). In the second control session, 30 trials (20 trials for
baboons) were completed in which the subject and partner alternated completing a task
for three low-value food rewards (named the large-quantity control). Because, the
reward quantity was increasing across control sessions, individual expectations should
not have affected the results.

Test 5: Inequitable Reward Quantity
In the inequity-quantity test, 30 trials (20 trials for baboons) were completed in
which the subject and partner alternated completing a task for a food reward. However,
the partner always received the large-quantity food reward (three pieces of low-value
food) after task completion, and the subject always received the small-quantity food
reward (one piece of low-value food) after task completion. To test for disadvantageous
inequity aversion, the subjects’ responses to this test were compared to their responses
in the small-quantity control. To test for advantageous inequity aversion, the partner’s
responses to this test were compared to their responses in the large-quantity control.
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Interobserver Reliability

Interobserver reliability scores were calculated to ensure that observations and
scoring of animals’ behaviors were without bias. 20% of live-time sessions at SNPRC
were scored by a second experimenter not involved in the study. All sessions
completed at NZP were video-recorded using a Canon EOS Rebel T5 camera, and
20% of experiments were scored from video footage by a person not involved in the
study. Each of the these people was given identical copies of the primary
experimenter’s data sheets and was asked to score whether each subject did or did not
complete the task and whether each subject did or did not accept the food reward.
Following this procedure, the score consistencies between the experimenter and the
second scorers were compared. The interobserver reliability score for sessions
observed at SNPRC was 1.00, indicating that 100% of baboon observations were
consistent between the experimenter and the second scorer. The interobserver
reliability score for sessions observed at NZP was .998, indicating that 99.8% of ape
observations were consistent between the experimenter and the second scorer.

Statistical Analysis

Wilcoxon signed-ranked tests for related samples were used to compare test
conditions to control conditions (Brosnan et al., 2010). To test for quality contrast
effects, the subjects’ responses to the quality contrast condition were compared to their
responses in the low-value control. The subjects’ responses to the disadvantageous
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inequitable quality condition were also compared to their responses in the low-value
control in order to test for disadvantageous inequity aversion when rewards varied by
quality. To test for advantageous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quality, the
subjects’ responses to the advantageous inequitable quality condition were compared
to their responses in the high-value control. To test for quantity contrast effects, the
subjects’ responses to the quantity contrast condition were compared to their responses
in the small-quantity control. The subjects’ responses to the disadvantageous
inequitable quantity condition were also compared to their responses in the smallquantity control in order to test for disadvantageous inequity aversion when rewards
varied by quantity. To test for advantageous inequity aversion when rewards varied by
quantity, the subjects’ responses to this test were compared to their responses in the
large-quantity control.
In order to determine whether there was variation in responses across conditions
for each species, Friedman’s tests were conducted (Brosnan et al., 2010). Friedman’s
test was used once for each species to determine whether there was variation across
quality conditions. Friedman’s tests were also conducted for each species to determine
whether responses varied across quantity conditions. Friedman’s tests were then
conducted a third time for each species to assess variation across all ten conditions
(including both quality and quantity conditions).
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Intraspecific Comparisons

Food Preference Tests and Training
Food preference tests showed that baboon subjects chose a mini marshmallow
(high-value reward) over a piece of carrot (low-value reward) in 60 out of 60 overall
trials (100% of the time). Gorilla subjects preferred a piece of grape (high-value reward)
over a piece of carrot (low-value reward) in 68 out of 80 overall trials (85% of the time).
Gibbon subjects preferred a piece of grape (high-value reward) over a piece of
cantaloupe (low-value reward) in 64 out of 80 overall trials (80% of the time). One pair
of orangutan subjects (Kyle and Bonnie) preferred a piece of grape (high-value reward)
over a piece of carrot (low-value reward) in 75 out of 80 overall trials (94% of the time).
The other pair of orangutan subjects (Kiko and Iris) preferred a piece of grape (highvalue reward) over a piece of orange (low-value reward) in 65 out of 80 overall trials
(81% of the time). Given that each pair was required to choose the high-value food item
over the low-value food item in at least 80% of trials, each pair of subjects moved on to
training.

45
During training sessions, each of the twelve baboon subjects, each of the two
gorilla subjects, each of the two gibbon subjects, and each of the four orangutan
subjects completed the designated task in exchange for a food reward in at least 80%
of trials (the criteria for beginning experimentation). Therefore, all baboon, gorilla,
gibbon, and orangutan subjects moved on to testing sessions.

Notes on Testing Orangutans
One pair of orangutans (Bonnie and Kyle) stopped willingly separating into
adjacent enclosures after the second day of testing, and therefore did not complete
either of the quality control conditions, either of the inequitable quality conditions, or
either of the inequitable quantity conditions. Therefore, this pair of individuals was only
included in analyses regarding quantity contrast effects.

Testing for Quality Contrast Effects
To test for quality contrast effects, subjects’ refusal rates during the quality
contrast condition (in which the subject was shown a high-value reward prior to task
completion but was given a low-value reward following task completion) were compared
to the same individuals’ refusal rates in the low-value control (in which the subject was
shown a low-value reward prior to task completion and was given that same low-value
reward following task completion) (Table IV). Results showed that five of the twelve
baboon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the quality contrast
condition than during the low-value control (Figure I; Table V). However, a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between baboons’
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refusal rates during the low-value control and the refusal rates during the quality
contrast condition (Z = -1.134, p = .257) (Table V). Both of the two gorilla subjects
responded with higher refusal rates during the quality contrast condition than during the
low-value control (Figure I; Table VI); however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed
that there was no statistical difference between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two
conditions (Z = -1.414, p = .157) (Table VI). Neither of the two gibbon subjects
responded with higher refusal rates during the quality contrast condition than during the
low-value control (Figure I; Table VII); a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there
was no statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during these conditions (Z =
-1.000, p = .317) (Table VII). Neither of the two orangutan subjects responded with
higher refusal rates during the quality contrast condition than during the low-value
control (Figure I; Table VIII); a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no
statistical difference between orangutans’ refusal rates during these conditions (Z =
0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII).

Testing for Quantity Contrast Effects
To test for quantity contrast effects, subjects’ refusal rates during the quantity
contrast condition (in which the subject was shown three pieces of low-value food prior
to task completion but was given only one piece of low-value food following task
completion) were compared to the same individuals’ refusal rates during the smallquantity control (in which the subject was shown only one piece of low-value food prior
to task completion and was given that same piece of low-value food following task
completion) (Table IV). Results showed that six of the twelve baboon subjects
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responded with higher refusal rates during the quantity contrast condition than during
the small-quantity control (Figure II; Table V). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that
there was a statistical difference between baboons’ refusal rates during the smallquantity control and the refusal rates during the quantity contrast condition (Z = -2.449,
p = .014) (Table V). Both of the gorilla subjects responded with higher refusal rates
during the quantity contrast condition than during the small-quantity control (Figure II;
Table VI); however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical
difference between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = -1.414, p =
.157) (Table VI). One of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher refusal rates
during the quantity contrast condition than during the small-quantity control (Figure II;
Table VII); a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference
between gibbons’ refusal rates during the small-quantity control and the refusal rates
during the quantity contrast condition (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VII). Two of the four
orangutan subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the quantity contrast
condition than during the small-quantity control (Figure II; Table VIII); however, a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between
orangutans’ refusal rates during these conditions (Z = -1.414, p = .157) (Table VIII).

Disadvantageous Inequitable Reward Quality
To test for disadvantageous inequity aversion when the reward qualities differed,
subjects’ refusal rates from the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition (in which
the subject was given a low-value reward after task completion and the partner was
given a high-value reward after task completion) were compared to the same

48
individuals’ refusal rates during the low-value control (in which both the subject and
partner were each given a low-value reward following task completion) (Table IV). Five
of the twelve baboon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the
disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than during the low-value control (Figure
III; Table V). However, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed no statistical difference
between baboons’ refusal rates during the low-value control and the refusal rates during
the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition (Z = -1.134, p = .257) (Table V). One
of the two gorilla subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the
disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than during the low-value control (Figure
III; Table VI), although a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical
difference between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = -1.000, p =
.317) (Table VI). One of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher refusal rates
during the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than during the low-value
control (Figure III; Table VII); however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there
was no statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during the low-value control
and the refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition (Z =
0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VII). Neither of the two orangutan subjects responded with
higher refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than
during the low-value control (Figure III; Table VIII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test
showed that there was no statistical difference between orangutans’ refusal rates during
these two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII).
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Disadvantageous Inequitable Reward Quantity
To test for disadvantageous inequity aversion when reward quantities differed,
subjects’ refusal rates from the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition (in which
the subject was given one piece of low-value food after task completion and the partner
was given three pieces of low-value food after task completion) were compared to the
same individuals’ refusal rates from the small-quantity control (in which both the subject
and partner were each given one piece of low-value food following task completion)
(Table IV). Four of the twelve baboon subjects responded with higher refusal rates
during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the small-quantity
control (Figure IV; Table V). However, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there
was no statistical difference between baboons’ refusal rates during the small-quantity
control and the same individual’s refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable
quantity condition (Z = -.816, p = .414) (Table V). Only one of the two gorilla subjects
responded with higher refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity
condition than during the small-quantity control (Figure IV; Table VI); however, a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between
gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VI). Only
one of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the
disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the small-quantity control
(Figure IV; Table VII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no
statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during the small-quantity control
and the refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition (Z =
0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VII). Neither of the two orangutan subjects responded with
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higher refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition than
during the small-quantity control (Figure IV; Table VIII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test
showed that there was no statistical difference between orangutans’ refusal rates during
these two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII).

Advantageous Inequitable Reward Quality
To test for advantageous inequity aversion when reward qualities differed,
subjects’ refusal rates from the advantageous inequitable quality condition (in which the
subject was given a high-value reward after task completion and the partner was given
a low-value reward after task completion) were compared to the same individuals’
refusal rates from the high-value control (in which both the subject and partner were
each given a high-value reward following task completion) (Table IV). Three of the
twelve baboon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the advantageous
inequitable quality condition than during the high-value control (Figure V; Table V). A
Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between
baboons’ refusal rates during the high-value control and the same individual’s refusal
rates during the advantageous inequitable quality condition (Z = -1.732, p = .083)
(Table V). Neither of the two gorilla subjects responded with higher refusal rates during
the advantageous inequitable quality condition than during the high-value control
(Figure V; Table VI), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no
statistical difference between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z =
0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VI). Neither of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher
refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quality condition than during the high-
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value control (Figure V; Table VII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there
was no statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during these two conditions
(Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VII). Similarly, neither of the two orangutan subjects
responded with higher refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quality
condition than during the high-value control (Figure V; Table VIII), and a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference between orangutans’
refusal rates during the high-value control and the refusal rates during the
advantageous inequitable quality condition (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII).

Advantageous Inequitable Reward Quantity
To test for advantageous inequity aversion when reward quantities differed,
subjects’ refusal rates from the advantageous inequitable quantity condition (in which
the subject was given three pieces of low-value food after task completion and the
partner was given one piece of low-value food after task completion) were compared to
the same individuals’ refusal rates from the large-quantity control (in which both the
subject and partner were each given three pieces of low-value food following task
completion) (Table IV). One of the twelve baboon subjects responded with higher
refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the
large-quantity control (Figure VI; Table V). A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that
there was no statistical difference between baboons’ refusal rates during the largequantity control and the same individual’s refusal rates during the advantageous
inequitable quantity condition (Z = -1.000, p = .317) (Table V). Only one of the two
gorilla subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the advantageous

52
inequitable quantity condition than during the large-quantity control (Figure VI; Table
VI), a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no statistical difference
between gorillas’ refusal rates during these two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table
VI). Only one of the two gibbon subjects responded with higher refusal rates during the
advantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the large-quantity control
(Figure VI; Table VII); however, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed that there was no
statistical difference between gibbons’ refusal rates during the large-quantity control
and the refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quantity condition (Z = 1.000, p = .317) (Table VII). Neither of the two orangutan subjects responded with
higher refusal rates during the advantageous inequitable quantity condition than during
the large-quantity control (Figure VI; Table VIII), and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test
showed that there was no statistical difference between orangutans’ refusal rates during
the two conditions (Z = 0.000, p = 1.000) (Table VIII).

Overall Results
To determine whether subjects’ refusal rates varied across conditions for each
species, Friedman’s tests were conducted. Friedman’s tests indicated that baboon
subjects’ refusal rates did not significantly vary across the five different conditions
related to reward quality (Χ2 = 7.447, p = .114) (Table IX). Friedman’s tests indicated
that baboon subjects’ refusal rates did significantly vary across the five different
conditions related to reward quantity (Χ2 = 13.491, p = .009) (Table IX), and the ten total
conditions overall (Χ2 = 20.810, p = .014) (Table IX). However the statistically significant
results found for baboons in the quantity contrast effects condition (Table V) may have
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caused the statistically significant variation across the five different conditions related to
reward quantity and the ten total conditions overall. Friedman’s tests indicated that
gorilla subjects’ refusal rates did not significantly vary across the five different
conditions related to reward quality (Χ2 = 6.400, p = .171) (Table IX), across the five
different conditions related to reward quantity (Χ2 = 4.000, p = .406) (Table IX), or
2

across the ten total conditions overall (Χ = 11.824, p = .223) (Table IX). Similarly,
Friedman’s tests indicated that gibbon subjects’ refusal rates did not significantly vary
across the five different conditions related to reward quality (Χ2 = 4.000, p = .406)
(Table IX), across the five different conditions related to reward quantity (Χ2 = 1.857, p
= .762) (Table IX), or across the ten total conditions overall (Χ2 = 6.581, p = .681)
(Table IX).
Because only two orangutan subjects completed all of the ten conditions, only
these two subjects were considered for analyses regarding variation across conditions.
These two orangutan subjects showed 0% refusal rates for each of the ten conditions
(Figures I-VI); therefore, no Friedman’s tests were needed to indicate variation across
conditions. It is clear to see that orangutan subjects’ refusal rates did not vary across
the five different conditions related to reward quality, across the five different conditions
related to reward quantity, or across the ten total conditions overall.

Interspecific Comparisons

Because most of the intraspecific results were not statistically significant, any
interspecific comparisons using this data must be interpreted with caution. Similarly, the
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small sample size of individuals within each species, as well as the small number of
species tested here, renders interpreting species differences more difficult.
Nonetheless, qualitatively comparing the trends observed for contrast effects and
inequity aversion in each species can provide insight into possible evolutionary
pressures that may have contributed to the emergence of inequity aversion in primates.

Contrast Effects
When testing for quality contrast effects, it was found that five (almost half of)
baboon subjects, both (all of) gorilla subjects, zero gibbon subjects, and zero orangutan
subjects responded negatively more often during the quality contrast condition than
during the low-value control (Tables V-VIII). Notably, these baboon subjects’ refusal
rates ranged from 10% to 40%, whereas these gorilla subjects’ refusal rates ranged
from 6.7% to only 13.3% (Figure I). When testing for quantity contrast effects, it was
found that six (half of) baboon subjects, both (all of) gorilla subjects, one (half of) gibbon
subject, and two (half of) orangutan subjects responded negatively more often during
the quantity contrast condition than during the small-quantity control (Tables V-VIII).
First, it is important to note that these results were only statistically significant for
baboons (Table V). Second, it is important to consider that these baboon subjects’
refusal rates ranged from 10% to 50%, whereas these gorilla subjects’ refusal rates
ranged from 6.7% to 40%, and these gibbon and orangutan subjects’ refusal rates were
all only 13.3% (Figure II).
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Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion
None of the four species tested (olive baboons, western-lowland gorillas, whitecheeked gibbons, or orangutans) showed significant differences in their refusal rates
during the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition as compared to the low-value
control. However, five of the twelve (nearly half of) baboon subjects, one of the two (half
of) gorilla subjects, and one of the two (half of) gibbon subjects responded negatively
more often in the disadvantageous inequitable quality condition than in the low-value
control (Tables V-VII). Notably, however, these baboon subjects’ refusal rates ranged
from 10% to 100%, whereas the gorilla and gibbon subjects’ refusal rates were both
only 13.3% (Figure III). Orangutan subjects’ refusal rates remained at 0% (Figure III).
A similar pattern was found when subjects were tested for disadvantageous
inequity aversion when reward quantities differed. Four of the twelve baboon subjects,
one of the two gorilla subjects, and one of the two gibbon subjects responded
negatively more often during the disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition than
during the small-quantity control (Tables V-VII). Again, it is important to note that these
baboon subjects’ refusal rates ranged from 10% to 80%, whereas these gorilla and
gibbon subjects’ refusal rates were both only 13.3% (Figure IV). Orangutan subjects’
refusal rates remained at 0% (Figure IV).

Advantageous Inequity Aversion
When testing for advantageous inequity aversion when reward qualities differed,
it was found that only three baboon subjects and zero ape subjects responded
negatively more often during the advantageous inequitable quality condition than during
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the high-value control (Tables V-VIII). When testing for advantageous inequity aversion
when reward quantities differed, it was found that only one baboon subject, one gorilla
subject, and one gibbon subject responded negatively more often during the
advantageous inequitable quantity condition than during the large-quantity control
(Tables V-VII). No orangutan subjects refused the reward or refused to participate when
given a greater amount of rewards than were given to a social partner (Table VIII).

Individual Trends

Although no statistically significant differences were found between any of the
conditions for gorillas (Table VI), individual trends did exist for this species. For
example, one gorilla individual (Kojo) responded negatively more often in both contrast
conditions and both disadvantageous inequity conditions than they did during the
control conditions (Figures I-IV). Similarly, the other gorilla subject (Kwame) responded
negatively more often in both contrast conditions than they did during the control
conditions but did not show disadvantageous inequity aversion (Figures I-IV).
Similar trends were found for gibbon subjects, although no statistically significant
differences were found between conditions for this species (Table VII). For instance,
one gibbon subject (Tuyen) responded negatively more often in both disadvantageous
inequity conditions, the quantity contrast condition, and the advantageous inequitable
quantity condition than they did during the control conditions (Figures II, III, IV, and VI).
On the other hand, the other gibbon subject (Sydney) did not respond negatively to any
of the conditions presented (Figures I-VI).
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Unlike gorillas and gibbons, baboon individuals’ responses were much more
variable. However, some trends among individuals were apparent. For instance, eleven
of the twelve baboon subjects responded negatively to at least one test condition, and
five of the twelve baboon subjects responded negatively to at least three test conditions
(Figures I-VI). This result was dichotomous in that an individual either responded
negatively to only one condition, or the individual responded negatively to at least half
of the conditions presented. This could indicate that some individuals are more
sensitive to inequity than others. Also, one baboon subject (27885) responded
negatively in all of the quality test conditions, but none of the quantity test conditions
(Figures I-VI), which may indicate that this individual was sensitive to differences in
reward quality but not differences in reward quantity.
While some individual trends seem apparent in orangutans, these results should
be interpreted with caution. For instance, one orangutan subject (Bonnie) responded to
both contrast conditions (Figures I and II). However, this individual was not tested
during the other conditions, so no conclusions can be made about whether this
individual always responds negatively during test conditions. One interesting trend,
however, is that two individuals (Kiko and Iris) did not respond to any of the conditions
presented (Figures I-VI).

Behavioral Observations

After recording ad libitum instances of behavior for each primate subject, the
number of instances of each behavior was determined for each experimental condition.
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It was found that none of the ape subjects exhibited instances of abnormal or
aggressive behavior (pacing, self-biting, cage-licking, yawning, or cage-banging) during
any of the control or test conditions. Similarly, no instances of abnormal or aggressive
behavior were observed for any of the baboon subjects during control conditions, and
none of the baboon subjects were observed pacing or self-biting during any of the test
conditions.
However, some of the baboon subjects did exhibit abnormal and aggressive
behaviors during some of the test conditions. During the quality contrast condition, one
baboon (27885) showed three instances of cage-banging, and another baboon (26058)
showed yawning behavior once and cage-banging behavior once. During the
disadvantageous inequitable quality condition, one baboon (13228) showed nine
instances of yawning, another baboon (16486) showed two instances of cage-licking,
and a third baboon (15225) showed nine instances of cage-licking. During the
disadvantageous inequitable quantity condition, one baboon (13228) showed seven
instances of yawning. During the advantageous inequitable quality condition, one
baboon (13246) showed one instance of yawning, and another baboon (16486) showed
one instance of cage-licking. During the advantageous inequitable quantity condition,
one baboon (26058) showed two instances of yawning. These results could indicate
that stress levels may have been elevated in some of the individual baboon subjects
when the individuals were given an unequal reward. However, instances of abnormal
and aggressive behavior were not assessed for these individuals prior to
experimentation, and therefore, this correlation should be further explored.
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CHAPTER 5

DISUCUSSION

Contrast Effects

Chen and Santos (2006) hypothesized that a negative response to unequal
outcomes is a reply to a violation of previous expectations, or contrast effects, rather
than a reply to a violation of social expectations. However, in this study, it was
hypothesized that none of the four nonhuman primate species tested would exhibit
contrast effects. This is because the primate subjects in this study were accustomed to
receiving food items that were less or more preferred than food items once shown or
given to them, and therefore, should not form expectations regarding the value or
quantity of their provisions. It was predicted that baboons, gorillas, gibbons, and
orangutans would not respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward following task
completion than the reward that was shown to them prior to task completion.
Results indicated that this prediction was supported statistically for gorillas,
gibbons, and orangutans when rewards varied by quality and when rewards varied by
quantity. The prediction was also supported statistically for baboons when rewards
varied by quality. However, the prediction was not supported statistically for baboons
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when rewards varied by quantity. There was a statistically significant difference
between baboons’ refusal rates during the quantity contrast effects condition -- in which
the subjects were shown three pieces of low-value reward prior to task completion but
were only given one piece of low-value reward following task completion—and baboons’
refusal rates during the low-value control – in which the subjects were shown one piece
of low-value reward prior to task completion and were given one piece of low-value
reward following task completion. This suggests that baboons may have individual
expectations about the amount of rewards they receive following the completion of a
task, but they may not have individual expectations about the quality of rewards they
receive following task completion.
While the baboon subjects in this study have, in the past, often received food
items that are less or more preferred than food items once shown or given to them, the
baboons may not be accustomed to a change in reward value following the completion
of a task. It is possible that requiring the monkeys to put in effort by completing a task
causes their individual expectations about rewards to change, because they may
expect similar rewards each time a task is completed. This would be consistent with
prior studies that showed that subjects’ reward refusal rates were lower when food
provisions were given in the absence of a task than when the subjects were required to
“work” for their food rewards (Brosnan et al., 2010; Talbot et al., 2011). However, this
does not explain why baboons react negatively to receiving a lesser amount of rewards
than previously shown to them but do not react negatively to receiving a lower quality
reward than previously shown to them.
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Although the results from this study suggest that the expectations about quality
and quantity are decoupled, it would still be expected that individual expectations
following task completion would be consistent regardless of whether the individual was
expecting a certain quality or quantity of rewards. From an ecological perspective, it
would make sense that individuals would wish to maximize the amount of food available
to them, perhaps leading to enhanced individual expectations about food quantity. One
explanation for the differences seen between quality contrast effects and quantity
contrast effects in olive baboons may be related to within-group food competition and
dominance rank. For instance, one study showed that dominance rank in olive baboons
was significantly correlated with the amount of food intake but not with food quality
(Barton and Whiten, 1993), suggesting that food competition was enhanced when the
amount of food was reduced but not when the food available varied by quality. This
may suggest that increased within-group food competition led to an increase in the
selective pressure to form expectations about the amount of food an individual should
receive; this may also explain why baboons respond negatively to quantity contrast
effects but not quality contrast effects.
Although food competition may not be as pronounced for western-lowland
gorillas, white-cheeked gibbons, and orangutans, the possibility that these species
exhibit quantity contrast effects cannot be rule out at this time. Because only a small
number of gorillas, gibbons, and orangutans were tested in this study, it is possible that
these species also respond negatively to receiving a lesser amount of rewards than
previously shown to them, and the small sample size is the cause of the statistically
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nonsignificant result. Therefore, quantity contrast effects should be further explored in
these species.

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion

In opposition to Chen and Santos (2006), Brosnan and de Waal (2003)
hypothesized that a negative response to unequal outcomes is a reaction to a violation
of social expectations, as opposed to a violation of previous expectations. This
suggests that inequity aversion evolved in tandem with an increase in cooperative
relationships with non-kin group members in species living in large, complex social
groups (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003). This hypothesis has thus far been supported
considering only chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella),
and macaques (Macaca mulatta and Macaca fascicularis) have been shown to be
inequity averse, while orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), squirrel monkeys (Saimiri
sciureus and Saimiri boliviensis), owl monkeys (Aotus), marmosets (Callithrix jacchus),
and tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) did not respond to inequitable outcomes (Brosnan
and de Waal, 2014).
In the current study, it was therefore hypothesized that primate species which
typically cooperate with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group members would show
aversive reactions to disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Because olive baboons
and western-lowland gorillas are species which typically live in large social groups
(greater than four individuals) and show cooperation among non-kin, non-pair-bonded
group members, these species were expected to respond negatively after receiving a
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lesser reward than their social partner. It was also predicted that gibbons and
orangutans would not respond negatively after receiving a lesser reward than their
social partner, because gibbons and orangutans do not live in large social groups and
do not typically cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-bonded conspecifics.
The predictions were supported statistically for gibbons and orangutans but not
for baboons and gorillas. Although no statistically significant differences in refusal rates
between the disadvantageous inequity conditions and the control conditions were found
for any of the four species in the current study, there was a similar trend in results for
baboons, gorillas, gibbons, and orangutans. This was true when rewards varied by
quality and when rewards varied by quantity. None of the orangutan subjects tested
responded negatively to disadvantageous inequity in the quality or quantity conditions.
However, nearly half of the baboon subjects and exactly half of the gorilla and gibbon
individuals tested had higher refusal rates during disadvantageous inequity conditions
than during control conditions. This suggests that a tendency for baboons, gorillas, and
gibbons to recognize and respond negatively to unequal reward distributions should not
yet be rejected. Based on the small sample size of individuals tested for each species
in this study, it is possible that future studies could find statistically significant
differences in response rates for baboons, gorillas, and gibbons.
Importantly, the results found for orangutans in this study match the results
found in a previous study that examined inequity aversion in orangutans (Brosnan et al.,
2011). In this and a previous study, orangutans were tested for inequity aversion using
a method which required the subjects to alternate exchanging a token for a food reward
with a social partner. It was found that the seven orangutan subjects tested in the
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previous study (Brosnan et al., 2011) and the two orangutans tested here did not have
higher refusal rates during the disadvantageous inequity conditions as compared to the
control conditions. Considering orangutans were the only species tested in the current
study that have been previously tested in inequity experiments, this similarity in results
across studies could be considered validation for the current study’s methodology.
While the predictions made about disadvantageous inequity aversion for
baboons, gorillas, and gibbons were not supported statistically, a few important points
should be taken into consideration. It is imperative to note that an absence of
performance in an individual does not equate to an absence of ability to respond. While
an individual’s negative reaction can be interpreted as an ability to recognize
differences in reward distribution, the absence of a negative reaction does not indicate
the absence of an ability to recognize unequal reward allocations.
One possibility for the lack of consistency among baboon, gorilla, and gibbon
responses to inequity could be attributed to individual differences within the trait. For
instance, in one study of chimpanzees by Brosnan and colleagues (2015), no
differences were found between some chimpanzees’ refusal rates during the inequity
condition and the individuals’ refusal rates during the control condition (Brosnan et al.,
2015). These results were unexpectedly contradictory to those found in another study
of chimpanzee inequity aversion led by some of the same researchers, in which
chimpanzee’s refusal rates statistically differed across conditions (Brosnan et al., 2010).
Additionally, a study of bonobo inequity aversion found that some subjects responded
negatively to receiving unequal rewards, but the results were not statistically significant
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(Brauer et al., 2009); this is similar to the results found for baboons, gorillas, and
gibbons in this study.
Importantly, observing individual differences in a behavioral trait is not unique to
inequity aversion; individual variation both within and across nonhuman primate species
has been recorded in several additional cognitive and behavioral traits in primates. For
example, one study showed that only one out of eleven chimpanzees tested for mirror
self-recognition actually exhibited the behavior (Swartz and Evans, 1991), whereas
another study showed that all four chimpanzees tested were able to recognize
themselves in mirrors (Gallup, 1970). Similarly, individual variation in mirror selfrecognition was found for both gibbons and gorillas. For instance, several studies
showed no evidence of the behavior in gibbons (Hyatt, 1998; Inoue-Nakamura, 1997;
Suddendorf and Collier-Baker, 2009), but one study did show that hylobatids are
capable of mirror self-recognition (Ujhelyi et al, 2000). In gorillas, some evidence of
mark-directed behaviors in the presence of mirrors has been found (Matsuzawa, 2001)
while one study did not show evidence of the behavior in this species (Suarez and
Gallup, 1981). These results pertaining to gibbons and gorillas are especially important
when considering the results of the current study of inequity aversion; the previous
mirror self-recognition studies show that individual variation within a behavioral trait is
not unusual for these two nonhuman primate groups.
In an attempt to explain why only some baboons, gorillas, and gibbons
responded with higher refusal rates during the inequity condition, the data were
qualitatively examined for correlations between refusal rates and demographic
variables, such as age, sex, dominance rank, social group size, and rearing history.
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However, no pattern was found that would correlate inequity aversion with any of these
characteristics. Primate subjects which responded negatively to inequity varied across
sex, age, dominance rank, social group size, and rearing history both within and
between species (Tables 1-3).
Similarly, responses to inequity do not appear to be related to the strength of the
pair’s social relationship. This is assumed because all baboon subjects were introduced
to their partner at the start of experimentation, and the strength of relationship was
presumed to be similar for all pairs in this species. This would be consistent with a
recent study of chimpanzee inequity aversion, in which no correlation was found
between inequity aversion and the length of time chimpanzee subjects had lived with
their experimental partner (Brosnan et al., 2015). However, the results from the current
study should be interpreted with caution, as the strength of relationship between
individuals in each pair was not quantified. Future studies may benefit from using an
established sociality index (Silk and Alberts, 2006) to assess bonds between individuals
in each pair prior to testing pairs for inequity aversion.
It is possible that inequity aversion varies among individuals for reasons other
than those that can be explained by demographic characteristics. For example,
individual variation in inequity aversion has been observed in humans, in which
responses appear to be context-dependent. Human inequity responses vary by culture
(Paulus, 2015; Shaw and Olson, 2012), the subjects’ goals (Skitka, 2012) and whether
inequity is related to productivity (Konrad and Pfeffer, 1990) or cooperation (Leung,
1986). This may suggest that several species, including baboons, gorillas, and gibbons,
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exhibit individual variation in inequity responses that is unrelated to demographic
characteristics.
One recent study exposed the individual variation in inequity aversion that can
result from using different methodological paradigms within the same species, even
when both paradigms require a task. The first study of inequity aversion in nonhuman
primates showed that capuchin monkeys were inequity averse when required to
complete a token-exchange task, in which the subject would receive either a lesser or
greater reward than a social partner after task completion (Brosnan and de Waal,
2003). However, Sheskin and colleagues (2014) used a different experimental
procedure and found contradictory results. In this study, capuchin monkeys were
required to choose between experimenters, who each gave the subject the same
reward; however, one experimenter gave the subject’s partner a lesser reward, and the
other experimenter gave the subject’s partner a greater reward (Sheskin et al., 2014).
The results showed that capuchin monkeys did not respond differently to equal and
unequal reward distributions (Sheskin et al., 2014), which contradicted the results
previously found for capuchin monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal, 2003).
While several researchers have highlighted the importance of a task for eliciting
inequity aversion (Brosnan, 2013; Brosnan and de Waal, 2012; Brosnan et al., 2010;
Hopper et al., 2013; Talbot et al., 2011; van Wolkenten et al., 2007), the study by
Sheskin and colleagues (2014) was the first to show that even when a task is used,
other procedural differences may lead to differing responses in inequity. The variation in
inequity responses found for capuchin monkeys suggests that inequity aversion may be
context-dependent for nonhuman primates. However, the tasks used in this study were
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identical to those used in previous studies that indicated the presence of inequity
aversion in nonhuman primates (Brosnan and de Waal, 2004; Talbot et al., 2011). Most
importantly, the procedure used for each subject was identical to that used for the
subject’s partner. For this reason, it could be assumed that the experimental procedure
used here is not the cause of the intraspecific individual variation observed in this study.
However, nonhuman primates may be sensitive to subtle variation in procedures that
were not apparent to the experimenter. In this case, potential subtle variation in
methodology cannot, at this point, be excluded as a cause of individual differences in
inequity responses.
Another recent study suggested that variation within inequity responses may be
related to variation within personality traits. This study showed that certain personality
variables characterized to the chimpanzee subjects (determined by caretaker
questionnaires; see Freeman et al., 2013) significantly affected individual refusal rates
during inequity testing (Brosnan et al., 2015). Chimpanzees which were rated more
highly on the “extraversion” variable were more likely to stop participating in the task or
refuse food rewards; individuals which scored more highly on the “openness,”
“agreeableness,” “reactivity,” and “dominance” variables, however, had lower overall
refusal rates (Brosnan et al., 2015:83). It is possible that the individual variation in
inequity aversion found for baboons, gorillas, and gibbons, similar to that found in
chimpanzees, is also due to differences in personality traits of the subjects. However,
personality data for the individuals tested in this study are not currently available, and
therefore, this correlation must be further explored.
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In addition to differences in personality and subtle procedural differences, other
possible explanations for the individual variation in inequity responses observed for
gibbons in particular cannot be ignored. One explanation for the variation in responses
between the two gibbon subjects may be related to vigilance toward the subject’s
partner. The gibbon subject who had higher refusal rates during inequity conditions than
control conditions was observed not to be consistently vigilant toward their social
partner during testing. Therefore, it was not fully clear that this individual was
continuously aware of rewards shown to and received by their partner. In contrast, the
second gibbon subject appeared to be consistently vigilant toward their partner during
inequity testing. It is possible that the results found for gibbons do not indicate the
presence of inequity aversion in the subject which responded to unequal reward
distributions and may not accurately reflect this species’ tendency toward inequity
aversion. Instead, the refusal to participate in the task may have been due to a lack of
vigilance toward their social partner, due to factors such as distractions in the subject’s
environment or a general disinterest in their partner.
A second possible explanation for why one gibbon subject reacted negatively to
inequity, but the other did not, may be due to the short relationship duration for the pair.
It is known that adult gibbons typically form strong social bonds with an opposite-sex
conspecific (Reichard and Boesch, 2003; Palombit, 1996), and it was predicted that
gibbons would not be inequity averse given their small group size and lack of
cooperation with non-kin, non-pair-bonded conspecifics. However, it has been
suggested that pair-living partners with a newly formed relationship are more likely to
respond negatively to unequal outcomes than partners with a longer relationship
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history, because replacing a social partner is less costly for the former individuals
(DeAngelo and Brosnan, 2013). Notably, the gibbon subject which responded
negatively to unequal reward allocations in this study had been recently moved to the
National Zoological Park and was introduced to their partner only 9 months prior to
inequity testing. The fact that this gibbon subject recently formed a new relationship
with their social partner could explain why this subject responded negatively to
disadvantageous inequity, although the relatively new partnership was likewise true for
the individual who did not show inequity aversion tendencies. It is possible that the
change in location in addition to the newly formed relationship caused the apparently
inequity averse gibbon subject to respond in a possibly anomalous manner. Future
studies of inequity aversion in gibbons would benefit from studying pairs which have
lived together for longer durations in order to determine whether the results found here
are anomalous for this species.

Advantageous Inequity Aversion

It was hypothesized that species which are group-living and which cooperate
with non-kin and non-pair-bonded group mates would be inequity averse. It was also
hypothesized that individuals within these species and which have a strong relationship
with their social partner will show aversive reactions to advantageous inequitable
outcomes. It was predicted that the gorilla subjects tested would respond negatively
after receiving a greater reward than their social partner, because the gorilla subjects
met these criteria; gorillas typically live in large groups and cooperate with non-kin
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conspecifics, and the gorilla subjects tested were full-siblings that have lived together
for thirteen years (indicating that they presumably had a strong social relationship). It
was also predicted that baboons, gibbons, and orangutans would not respond
negatively after receiving a greater reward than their social partner. This was because
gibbons and orangutans are not large-group living species which cooperate with nonkin, non-pair-bonded conspecifics, and the baboon subjects tested had no prior
exposure to their social partners; therefore, the baboon subjects were not presumed to
have strong social relationships.
The prediction was supported statistically for baboons, gibbons, and orangutans
but was not supported statistically for gorillas. The results indicated that there was no
significant difference in refusal rates during the advantageous inequity conditions as
compared to the control conditions for any of the four species tested. This was true
when rewards varied by quality as well as when rewards varied by quantity. Only one of
the two gorillas had a higher refusal rate when they were given a greater amount of
rewards than their social partner as compared to their refusal rate during the largequantity control. Furthermore, neither of the two gorillas had higher refusal rates when
they were given a greater value reward than their social partner as compared to their
refusal rates during the high-value control.
Notably, one baboon subject had a higher refusal rate when they were given a
greater amount of rewards than their social partner as compared to their refusal rate
during the large-quantity control. Similarly, three baboon subjects had higher refusal
rates when they were given a greater value reward than their social partner as
compared to their refusal rates during the high-value control. This result was especially
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surprising considering none of the baboon subjects had a prior relationship with their
conspecific partner.
One possible reason why no significant differences were found between gorillas’
responses during advantageous inequity conditions and their responses during control
conditions is that the sample size was too small to detect statistically significant
differences. It is also possible that the social relationship of the gorilla pair did not differ
substantially from the relationships of the other species. No direct measure of social
relationship strength was conducted, and social relationship strength was assumed a
priori as an outcome of social structure. However, such an assumption may be
inadequate to reveal subtle differences in the response to inequitable rewards.
Another plausible explanation is that advantageous inequity aversion is not
related to the strength of the relationship between subject and partner. This would be
consistent with recent results found in a study of chimpanzee inequity aversion, in
which no correlation was found between inequity aversion and the length of time
chimpanzee subjects had lived with their experimental partner (Brosnan et al., 2015).
Although humans respond negatively to inequity more often when they have a stronger
relationship with their social partner and when partners have spent more time together,
this may not be true for nonhuman primates. However, little data has been collected to
test this in nonhuman primates, and therefore, this idea should be further explored.
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Addressing the Evolution of Inequity Aversion

Although some olive baboons, western-lowland gorillas, and white-cheeked
gibbons showed negative responses to inequitable outcomes, these observations must
be considered preliminary as they were not statistically significant. Because of the
mixed nature of the results, i.e. some baboons, gorillas, and gibbons did not show
inequity aversion while other members of these species did, it is difficult to label these
species as inequity averse. Therefore, using this data to make assumptions about
whether the trait is homologous or homoplastic for primate lineages becomes even
more complicated.
In contrast to the mixed results found for baboons, gorillas, and gibbons, none of
the orangutan subjects in this study responded negatively to unequal reward
distributions. This confirmed the results from a prior study of orangutan inequity
aversion (Brosnan et al., 2011) and suggests that inequity aversion is unlikely to be
present in orangutans. With regard to orangutans, this data can more easily be used to
address the question of whether inequity aversion is a homology or homoplasy in apes.
If future tests of larger samples of western-lowland gorillas and white-cheeked
gibbons show that these species are inequity averse, a few hypotheses could be made
about the evolution of inequity aversion in the superfamily Hominoidea. The presence
of inequity aversion in humans, chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and gibbons would
mean that orangutans are the only ape species that is not averse to inequitable
outcomes. This may suggest that inequity aversion is homologous, that it may have
already been present in the last common ancestor of all apes, and that it was

74
secondarily lost only in orangutans. In this case, evolutionary pressures that would have
led to the loss of inequity aversion in orangutans would have to be further explored.
If gorillas and gibbons were suggested to be inequity averse, it would also be
possible for inequity aversion to have been absent in the last common ancestor of all
apes. This would suggest that present-day inequity aversion in apes is a homoplasic
trait that evolved independently in all ape lineages except Pongo, although this is the
least parsimonious explanation. In this case, it would be necessary to explore the
possible socioecological pressures that would have caused inequity aversion to evolve
in gibbons, gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans.
If future tests of western-lowland gorillas and white-cheeked gibbons show that
these species are not averse to inequitable outcomes, it is likely that inequity aversion
is homoplastic for the superfamily Hominoidea. Because it is rare for a trait to be lost in
several species in one lineage, it is unlikely that inequity aversion was present in the
last common ancestors of apes, but secondarily lost in orangutans, gorillas, and
gibbons. Nonetheless, it would be necessary to explore evolutionary pressures that
could lead to the loss of inequity aversion in these three species of the Hominoidea
lineage.
If future tests of a larger sample of olive baboons can confirm that this species is
inequity averse, a few additional hypotheses about the evolution of inequity aversion
could be made. Considering rhesus macaques and long-tailed macaques have been
suggested to respond negatively to inequitable outcomes (Hopper et al., 2013; Massen
et al., 2012), inequity aversion could be a homologous trait in the subfamily
Cercopithecinae and in the superfamily Cercopithecoidea. As only three Old World
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monkeys have now been tested for inequity aversion, even if all three species were
considered inequity averse, it is still possible that the trait is homoplastic for Old World
monkey lineages. For instance, olive baboons, rhesus macaques, and long-tailed
macaques may have evolved inequity aversion in response to similar socioecological
pressures, such as increased cooperation among non-kin group members. Additional
members of the subfamily Cercopithecinae, such as vervet monkeys, and additional
members of the superfamily Cercopithecoidea, such as colobus monkeys of the
subfamily Colobinae, would need to be tested for inequity aversion to better understand
the evolution of the trait in these lineages and to come to a better conclusion of the
trait’s existence at higher taxonomic nodes, including all Old World monkeys.
If future tests of olive baboons suggest that this species is not averse to
inequitable outcomes, there could be more than one evolutionary explanation for the
trait’s absence in this species. It is possible that inequity aversion could be a
homologous trait in the subfamily Cercopithecinae and in the superfamily
Cercopithecoidea, but the trait was secondarily lost in olive baboons. It is also possible
that inequity aversion is a homoplasy for Old World monkeys; it would then follow that
perhaps only macaques or only some macaque species were exposed to evolutionary
pressures that led to the emergence of the trait, whereas olive baboons were not
subjected to these evolutionary pressures. Studying additional Old World monkey
species is a necessary requirement to advance the question of the evolution of inequity
aversion and would help to better understand this distinction.
Given that humans and four species of nonhuman primates have been shown to
be inequity averse, while several other species did not respond to inequitable outcomes
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(Brosnan and de Waal, 2014), it may be argued that it is unlikely that inequity aversion
is homologous for the order Primates. However, individual variation in the trait was
found even in species that do show inequity aversion, such as humans (Paulus, 2015;
Pruitt, 1985; Skitka, 2012), chimpanzees (Brosnan et al., 2015) and bonobos (Brauer et
al., 2009), and now this study extends this list to include olive baboons, westernlowland gorillas, and white-cheeked gibbons. Considering only a small number of
individuals from each nonhuman primate species have been tested for inequity
aversion, it seems possible that the samples may have contained some individuals from
each species that may respond differently from their conspecifics. Therefore, it is too
soon to rule out the possibility that all primates are capable of responding negatively to
unequal reward distributions. In conclusion, a homology of inequity aversion for the
order Primates is still a possibility, suggesting that inequity aversion could have been
present in the last common ancestor of primates.
More species within the class Mammalia need to be investigated if future studies
of primate inequity aversion show that the trait may be homologous in the order
Primates. A few studies already suggest that inequity aversion may be present in nonprimate mammals, such as domestic dogs (Range et al., 2009), which have been
shown to respond negatively to inequitable outcomes. Researchers have interpreted
these results to suggest that inequity aversion evolved in domestic dogs in response to
an increase in cooperative relationships in this species (Brosnan and de Waal, 2014).
Testing for inequity aversion in mammalian species which do not live in large groups or
cooperate with non-kin conspecifics, such as gray foxes (Lord, 1961), could highlight
whether the trait may have evolved in response to increased cooperation and could
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also lead to inferences about whether the trait may be homologous for the class
Mammalia.

Conclusions

There are several possibilities as to why no statistically significant results were
found to support the overall hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between
inequity aversion and species sociality. One explanation is that the sample size in this
study was too small to detect statistically significant differences between conditions.
While a sample size of twenty nonhuman primate subjects is relatively large compared
to previous studies of inequity aversion (Brosnan et al., 2010; Brosnan et al., 2011),
incorporating only two western-lowland gorillas, two white-cheeked gibbons, four
orangutans, and twelve olive baboons may not have be adequate to detect withinspecies responses to unequal resource distributions. Similarly, including only four
species in a study of inequity aversion may not have given an accurate account of
between-species differences in inequity aversion. Therefore, future studies of
nonhuman primate inequity aversion should attempt to maximize both the number of
individuals within a species as well as the number of species tested in a given study.
A second explanation for a lack of statistical support for nonhuman primate
inequity aversion in this study is the possibility that sociality was inadequately assessed.
For example, this study considered both orangutans and gibbons to be “semi-social”
(i.e. they do not live in large groups or cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-bonded
conspecifics). Additionally, gorillas and baboons were both considered to be “social”
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(i.e. they live in large social groups and cooperate with non-kin, non-pair-bonded group
members). However, this “social”/”semi-social” dichotomy greatly simplifies each
species’ social relations with conspecifics and omits important differences between the
four species’ social organizations.
For example, it is important to recognize the differences between orangutan and
gibbon social organizations. Orangutans, for instance, are considered solitary foragers
which have only brief social interactions with non-kin conspecifics (Mitani et al., 1991; te
Boekhorst et al., 1990). Gibbons, on the other hand, form strong pair-bonds with a nonrelative conspecific and spend a large amount of time interacting and cooperating with
that individual (Reichard and Boesch, 2003; Palombit, 1996). While white-cheeked
gibbons, like orangutans, do not typically cooperate with multiple individuals of their
species, it may not be appropriate to consider gibbons as equally “semi-social” as
orangutans.
Likewise, western-lowland gorillas and olive baboons have very different social
structures. For example, western-lowland gorillas often live in family groups averaging
nine individuals (Yamagiwa et al., 2003) and consisting of one or two males and
multiple females or in bachelor groups of all adult males (Doran and McNeilage, 1998).
Olive baboons, on the other hand, typically live in multi-male, multi-female, fissionfusion societies, averaging between 15 and 150 individuals (Barton et al, 1996; Dunbar
and Dunbar, 1974; Ray and Sapolsky, 1992; Rowel, 1966). Considering westernlowland gorillas and olive baboons to be equally “social” greatly reduces the important
variation between the social organizations of these two species.
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Given the vast variation in social structure among all nonhuman primate species,
future studies examining the relationship between primate inequity aversion and
species sociality may benefit from reassessing the definition of sociality. Specifically, it
may be favorable to consider sociality as a continuous variable, as opposed to a
dichotomous characteristic. If sociality was assessed as a continuous variable, it may
better explain why the most social species tested in this study, olive baboons, had the
highest refusal rates during most of the test conditions, why the intermediately social
species, gorillas and gibbons, had intermediate refusal rates, and why the least social
species, the orangutans, had the lowest refusal rates (Figures I-VI). Although it is
feasible that inequity aversion evolved in tandem with increased cooperation among
individuals living in large groups of conspecifics, more meaningful variation in inequity
aversion between different cooperative, group-living species may be found by treating
sociality as a continuous variable.

80

TABLES

TABLE I. Baboon Demographic Characteristics
Pair #

Relationship
w/ Partner
None
None
None
None
None

Age

Sex

1
1
2
2
3

Subject
ID
27666
27885
13228
26058
13246

9
9
19
10
19

Male
Male
Female
Female
Female

Group
Size
8
4
12
13
11

3

16486

None

14

Female

14

4
4
5
5
6
6

15225
14068
28420
14528
14800
11284

None
None
None
None
None
None

16
17
9
17
22
17

Male
Male
Male
Male
Female
Female

8
6
4
9
9
11

Group Composition
All 9-10 y.o. adult males
All 8-10 y.o. adult males
One adult male, eleven 11-21 y.o. females
One adult male, twelve 11 y.o. females
One adult male, nine 13-20 y.o. females,
one infant
One adult male, thirteen 10-13 y.o.
females
All 11-18 y.o. adult males
All 11-15 y.o. adult males
All 9 y.o. adult males
One adult male, eight 12-17 y.o. females
All 18-22 y.o. adult females
One adult male, nine 13-20 y.o. females,
one infant

TABLE II. Additional Baboon Characteristics
Pair #
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6

Subjec
t ID
27666
27885
13228
26058
13246
16486
15225
14068
28420
14528
14800
11284

Rearing History
Mother-reared until 10 months
Mother-reared until 10 months
Nursery-reared
Mother-reared
Mother-reared
Mother-reared until 9 months
Mother-reared until 11 months
Mother-reared until 9 months
Mother-reared until 12 months
Mother-reared until 10 months
Mother-reared until 10 months
Mother-reared until 6 months

Days in
Clinic
5
13
8
7
85
78
15
13
31
3
5
4

Cage Size

Reason for Clinic Stay

1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m
1.5 x 1.8 m
1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m
1 x 1.2 m

Left rear foot injury
Lacerated left hand
Lacerated tail
Multiple body lacerations
Fractured left arm
Fractured left arm
Lacerated left cheek
Weight loss
Lacerated right hand
Cheek abscess
Hair growth
Sedation recovery
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TABLE III. Ape Demographic Characteristics
Pair #

Species

7
7
8

Subject
ID
Kwame
Kojo
Sydney

Age

Sex

Gorilla
Gorilla
Gibbon

Relationship
w/ Partner
Full siblings
Full siblings
Bonded pair

15
13
15

Male
Male
Male

Group
Size
2
2
2

8

Tuyen

Gibbon

Bonded pair

8

Female

2

9

Kiko

Orangutan

Bonded pair

27

Male

2

9

Iris

Orangutan

Bonded pair

28

Female

2

10

Kyle

Orangutan

Bonded pair

18

Male

2

10

Bonnie

Orangutan

Bonded pair

38

Female

2

Group Composition
Two adult males
Two adult males
One adult male, one adult
female
One adult male, one adult
female
One adult male, one adult
female
One adult male, one adult
female
One adult male, one adult
female
One adult male, one adult
female

TABLE IV. Conditions and Rewards for all Primate Subjects
Test Condition

Quality Contrast
Quantity Contrast
Disadvantageous
Inequity-Quality
Disadvantageous
Inequity-Quantity
Advantageous
Inequity-Quality
Advantageous
Inequity-Quantity

Reward
Shown to
Subject

Reward
Given to
Subject

Reward
Shown to
Partner

Reward
Given to
Partner

High-value
3 pieces lowvalue

Low-value
1 piece lowvalue

High-value
3 pieces lowvalue

Low-value
1 piece lowvalue

Low-value
1 piece lowvalue

Low-value
1 piece lowvalue

High-value
3 pieces lowvalue

High-value
3 pieces lowvalue

High-value
3 pieces lowvalue

High-value
3 pieces lowvalue

Low-value
1 piece lowvalue

Low-value
1 piece lowvalue

Control
Condition
Low-value
Control
Small-quantity
Control
Low-value
Control
Small-quantity
Control
High-value
Control
Large-quantity
Control

TABLE V. Test Results for Baboons
Z
value

p
value

Quality Contrast Effects

Ratio of
Individuals which
Responded
5 out of 12

-1.134

0.257

Quantity Contrast Effects

6 out of 12

-2.449

0.014

Test

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality

7 out of 12

-1.134

0.257

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity

6 out of 12

-0.816

0.414

Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality

3 out of 12

-1.732

0.083

Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity

2 out of 12

-1.000

0.317
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TABLE VI. Test Results for Gorillas
Z
value

p
value

Quality Contrast Effects

Ratio of
Individuals which
Responded
2 out of 2

-1.414

0.157

Quantity Contrast Effects

2 out of 2

-1.414

0.157

Test

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality

1 out of 2

-1.000

0.317

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity

1 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality

0 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity

0 out of 2

0.000

1.000

TABLE VII. Test Results for Gibbons
Z
value

p
value

Quality Contrast Effects

Ratio of
Individuals which
Responded
0 out of 2

-1.000

0.317

Quantity Contrast Effects

1 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality

1 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity

1 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality

0 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity

1 out of 2

-1.000

0.317

Z
value

p
value

0.000

1.000

Test

TABLE VIII. Test Results for Orangutans

Quality Contrast Effects

Ratio of
Individuals which
Responded
0 out of 2

Quantity Contrast Effects

2 out of 4

-1.414

0.157

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality

0 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Disadvantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity

0 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quality

0 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Advantageous Inequity Aversion-Quantity

0 out of 2

0.000

1.000

Test
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TABLE IX. Results of Friedman’s Tests
Species

5 Quality Conditions

5 Quantity Conditions

2

Χ = 13.491, p = .009

2

Χ = 4.000, p = .406

2

Baboons

Χ = 7.447, p = .114

Gorillas

Χ = 6.400, p = .171

Gibbons

Χ = 4.000, p = .406

Orangutans

N/A

2

All 10 Conditions
2

Χ = 20.810, p = .014

2

Χ = 11.824, p = .223

2

Χ = 1.857, p = .762

2

Χ = 6.581, p = .681

N/A

N/A

2
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FIGURES

FIGURE I. Contrast effects when rewards varied by quality. Refusal rates of each
nonhuman primate subject during the quality contrast condition compared to refusal
rates during the low-value control.
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FIGURE II. Contrast effects when rewards varied by quantity. Refusal rates of each
nonhuman primate subject during the quantity contrast condition compared to refusal
rates during the small-quantity control.
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FIGURE III. Disadvantaegous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quality. Refusal
rates of each nonhuman primate subject during the disadvantageous inequitable quality
condition compared to refusal rates during the low-value control.
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FIGURE IV. Disadvantaegous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quantity.
Refusal rates of each nonhuman primate subject during the disadvantageous
inequitable quantity condition compared to refusal rates during the small-quantity
control.
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FIGURE V. Advantaegous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quality. Refusal
rates of each nonhuman primate subject during the advantageous inequitable quality
condition compared to refusal rates during the high-value control.
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FIGURE VI. Advantaegous inequity aversion when rewards varied by quantity. Refusal
rates of each nonhuman primate subject during the advantageous inequitable quantity
condition compared to refusal rates during the large-quantity control.
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